Malcolm Sheppard v. Visitors of VSU
993 F.3d 230
| 4th Cir. | 2021Background
- Malcolm Sheppard, a Virginia State University student, confronted a former girlfriend after discovering missing items; he allegedly pushed her in a hallway. Students A and B were also implicated for taking items.
- VSU Office of Judicial Affairs (OJA) charged Sheppard with assault and Students A/B with larceny; OJA held a hearing six days later and found Sheppard responsible, imposing non‑suspension sanctions.
- A Chesterfield County protective order barred Sheppard from campus; Sheppard alleges he received no notice and was later informed that he had been suspended/withdrawn from courses.
- OJA’s proceedings against Students A and B occurred later: Student B was ultimately found not responsible and Student A was later found responsible for theft.
- Sheppard filed an OCR complaint alleging sex‑based selective enforcement; OCR’s preliminary finding led VSU to enter a Resolution Agreement rather than a full OCR investigation.
- Sheppard sued under Title IX and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (due process and equal protection against OJA Director Debose). The district court dismissed; the Fourth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper pleading standard for Title IX claims in university disciplinary proceedings | Yusuf framework applies; Sheppard invoked selective enforcement theory | Court should assess whether facts plausibly show discrimination on basis of sex | Court adopts Seventh Circuit approach: plaintiff must plead facts that, if true, raise a plausible inference that the school discriminated on the basis of sex; Yusuf theories remain viable ways to plead but must satisfy Title IX text |
| Did Sheppard plausibly plead a Title IX selective enforcement claim (causation) | OJA acted swiftly against Sheppard but delayed action against female students; OCR complaint compelled action against Students A/B | Timing differences and different charges do not show sex‑based causation; parties were not similarly situated | Dismissed: Sheppard failed to plead that sex was the but‑for cause of the differential treatment; factual differences (different charges, protective order, scheduling) undermined similarity allegation |
| Did Sheppard plead an equal protection violation under § 1983 | Same facts establish disparate treatment because of male gender | Complaint lacks allegations showing Debose had discriminatory animus; plaintiffs not similarly situated | Dismissed: failed to plausibly allege similarly situated comparator or discriminatory motive |
| Is Debose liable under § 1983 for due process violations, or entitled to qualified immunity | Debose deprived Sheppard of property interest in continued enrollment without adequate process | No clearly established constitutional right to continued enrollment in higher education; qualified immunity applies | Dismissed on qualified immunity grounds: right to continued enrollment not clearly established, so Debose is entitled to immunity |
Key Cases Cited
- Yusuf v. Vassar Coll., 35 F.3d 709 (2d Cir. 1994) (articulated erroneous‑outcome and selective‑enforcement frameworks for campus discipline)
- Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652 (7th Cir. 2019) (adopted a text‑based Title IX standard: plead facts that plausibly infer sex discrimination)
- Doe v. Univ. of the Sciences, 961 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2020) (applies a plausibility standard tied to Title IX text)
- Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (interprets "because of" language to require but‑for causation)
- Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013) (but‑for causation required for retaliation claims using similar statutory language)
- Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (2005) (Title IX retaliation claim requires showing retaliation "because" of complaint)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (qualified immunity analysis framework)
- Tigrett v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 290 F.3d 620 (4th Cir. 2002) (discusses assumption—but not definitive recognition—of a protected property interest in continued enrollment)
- Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Schools, 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011) (violations of school procedures alone do not, by themselves, trigger federal due process protection)