Maksym v. Board of Election Commissioners
950 N.E.2d 1051
Ill.2011Background
- Maksym and McMahon objected to Rahm Emanuel’s mayoral candidacy in Chicago, alleging failure to meet residency requirements.
- Board of Election Commissioners allowed Emanuel to appear on the ballot after an evidentiary hearing; circuit court affirmed, appellate court reversed and excluded him from the ballot.
- Appellate court adopted Board’s factual findings but created a novel standard for residency, defining “resided in” as “actually live/actually reside.”
- Supreme Court granted leave to appeal and stayed the appellate court’s decision.
- Question presented: what does “resided in” mean for purposes of the Municipal Code residency requirement for candidacy; whether abandonment of Chicago residence occurred while Emanuel served as Presidential Chief of Staff.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Meaning of 'reside[d] in' for candidacy | Maksym asserts traditional residency: physical presence plus intent to remain. | Emanuel/Board contends a broader, actual-residence test applies. | Applying Smith standard, 'resided in' means physical presence plus intent; abandonment must be proven. |
| Whether applicant abandoned Chicago residence | Objectors must show abandonment; Emanuel maintained ties to Chicago. | Board correctly found no abandonment based on evidence of ties and intent to return. | Abandonment not proven; residency persisted. |
| Role of Smith v. Frisbie in this case | Smith governs residency in candidacy context; should control. | Appellate court properly distinguished Smith but misapplied it. | Smith remains controlling framework for residency analysis. |
| Impact of in pari materia with Election Code | Same meaning of residency should apply in Municipal and Election Codes. | Different contexts could justify different interpretations. | Residency means the same concept in both codes; harmonized interpretation governs. |
| Appellate court’s new standard for residency | New standard (actually resides) is undefined and improper. | Standard necessary to resolve modern residency ambiguities. | rejected; not adopted; adherence to traditional residency doctrine affirmed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Smith v. People ex rel. Frisbie, 44 Ill. 16 (1867) (established intent-and-abandonment approach to residency)
- Pope v. Board of Election Commissioners, 370 Ill. 196 (1938) (residence requires domicile plus permanent abode; ties residency to domicile concept)
- Park v. Hood, 374 Ill. 36 (1940) (residency framework incorporating domicile and permanent abode)
- Clark v. Quick, 377 Ill. 424 (1941) (residence/domicile analysis in Illinois; permanence considerations)
- Moran v. Teolis, 20 Ill.2d 95 (1960) (distinguishes electors vs. municipal office qualifiers; precludes broad residency divergence)
- Cinkus v. Village of Stickney Municipal Officers Electoral Board, 228 Ill.2d 200 (2008) (in pari materia and harmonization of Election/M Municipal Code principles)
- Estate of Moir, 207 Ill. 180 (1904) (residence continuation presumption; burden on challenger to prove abandonment)
- Kreitz v. Behrensmeyer, 125 Ill. 141 (1888) (abandonment test and intent-based residence)