Maksym v. Board of Election Commissioners
942 N.E.2d 739
Ill. App. Ct.2011Background
- Petitioners object to Rahm Emanuel's candidacy for Chicago mayor and the Board dismissed the objections.
- Emanuel owned the Hermitage Chicago residence and lived there from 1998 until 2009, with his family there intermittently.
- From Jan 2009 to Oct 2010 Emanuel largely resided in Washington, D.C., leasing the Hermitage and a D.C. home, while maintaining ties to Chicago (taxes, Illinois license, voting address).
- In Oct 2010 Emanuel began living in a Chicago apartment for the campaign term ending Jun 2011, while continuing to intend to return to Chicago after government service.
- The Board found Emanuel satisfied the elector residency and the municipal residency requirements, but the petitioners challenged the one-year Chicago residency prerequisite.
- The circuit court affirmed the Board; the appellate court reversed, ruling Emanuel did not meet the municipal one-year residence requirement and thus should be excluded from the ballot.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Emanuel resided in Chicago for one year before the election | Maksym/McMahon contend he did not have a permanent Chicago residence for a full year. | Emanuel’s Chicago ties and intent to return show actual residence for the one-year period. | No; Emanuel did not satisfy the one-year actual residence requirement. |
| Whether the Election Code's 3-2 business exception applies to candidates | 3-2(a) exempts residents absent on U.S. business; applies to candidates as well. | The 3-2(a) exception applies only to electors, not candidates. | Applies only to electors; does not save candidate candidacy. |
| Whether the military absence provision (3.1-10-5(d)) yields a residency exemption for candidates | Service in Washington, D.C. should be treated as residency under 3.1-10-5(d). | 3-1-10-5(d) applies to active military service, not to candidate residency. | Applies only to certain military-service residency, not to candidate residency. |
| Whether the Elections Code and Municipal Code should be read in pari materia to equate candidate and voter residency | In pari materia requires harmonious interpretation, potentially aligning residency standards. | In pari materia does not force identical meanings; distinctions exist between voters and candidates. | They may be read in harmony but are distinguishable; not controlling to equate the standards. |
Key Cases Cited
- Cinkus v. Village of Stickney Municipal Officers Electoral Board, 228 Ill.2d 200 (Illinois Supreme Court, 2008) (establishes standard of review for electoral board findings and mixed questions)
- Smith v. People ex rel. Frisbie, 44 Ill. 16 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1867) (residence/domicile concepts in assessing eligibility)
- Park v. Hood, 374 Ill. 36 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1940) (residence equals permanent abode; intention and actual abode control)
- Pope v. Board of Election Commissioners, 370 Ill. 196 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1938) (distinguishes residence from domicile; requires permanent abode for voters)
- Walsh v. County Officers Electoral Board of Cook County, 267 Ill.App.3d 972 (Illinois Appellate Court, 1994) (treats residency for candidacy with consideration of actual presence and intent)
- Delk v. Board of Election Commissioners of the City of Chicago, 112 Ill.App.3d 735 (Illinois Appellate Court, 1983) (reiterates evidence standard in residency questions)
- Baumgartner v. City of Chicago, 355 Ill.App.3d 842 (Illinois Appellate Court, 2005) (distinguishes voter vs candidate residency and emphasizes actual residence)
- Dillavou v. City of Bloomington, 260 Ill.App.3d 128 (Illinois Appellate Court, 1994) (supports residence-abandonment analysis and the role of intent)
- Kreitz v. Behrensmeyer, 125 Ill. 141 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1888) (abandonment depends on intent and acts; long-standing residence principle)