Makowski v. Governor
894 N.W.2d 753
Mich. Ct. App.2016Background
- Matthew Makowski was convicted of first-degree murder (1988) and sentenced to life without parole.
- In 2010 the Michigan Parole and Commutation Board recommended commutation; the Governor signed a commutation that was later (attemptedly) revoked.
- Makowski sued; Michigan Supreme Court held the Governor could not revoke the signed commutation and ordered the DOC to reinstate a commutation-equivalent sentence (minimum term equal to time served as of the board’s commutation recommendation, maximum life) and remanded him to the parole board.
- After remand the Parole Board declined to parole Makowski, citing minimization of responsibility and need for more insight into the offense.
- Makowski asked the Court of Claims to retain jurisdiction and order immediate parole, arguing the commutation effectively entitled him to release; the Court of Claims refused, concluding the commutation made him eligible for parole but did not mandate it.
- Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed: the commutation reduced sentence severity and created parole eligibility, but did not eliminate the board’s discretion to deny parole; therefore the Court of Claims properly declined to retain supervisory jurisdiction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Governor’s commutation required immediate parole | Makowski: commutation amounted to parole; board had ministerial duty to release him | Governor/Secretary: commutation made him eligible for parole only; board retains discretion | Held: commutation created eligibility but did not mandate parole; board retained discretion |
| Whether historical practice of releasing similarly-commuted prisoners created a legal entitlement | Makowski: prior practice created expectation and should require identical treatment | Defendants: past practice does not create a constitutional or statutory right to release | Held: past practice does not create a protected right to clemency or parole |
| Whether the Court of Claims should retain jurisdiction to supervise board’s parole decision | Makowski: retain jurisdiction to ensure board processes him for immediate release | Defendants: board has exclusive parole authority once sentence is commuted to parolable term | Held: no basis to retain jurisdiction; victim of commutation is subject to board’s normal parole process |
| Whether due process required immediate release or additional procedural protections | Makowski: due-process violation by denying parole after commutation | Defendants: commutation conferred only ordinary parole-eligibility; no liberty interest created | Held: only ordinary parole procedural rights apply; no due-process violation established |
Key Cases Cited
- Kent Co Prosecutor v. Kent Co. Sheriff, 425 Mich 718 (1986) (commutation reduces sentence severity but original sentence remains a court judgment)
- Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458 (1981) (no constitutional right to clemency; past discretionary practice does not create entitlement)
- In re Parole of Haeger, 294 Mich App 549 (2011) (a potential parolee who remains in prison lacks a protected liberty interest in parole)
- Kincaid v. Cardwell, 300 Mich App 513 (2013) (standard for reviewing statutory interpretation and trial-court application)
- People v. Ackley, 497 Mich 381 (2015) (standard of review for constitutional questions)