Maier v. Wilson, 2017 MT 316

Background

On April 9, 2013, Maier (pedestrian) was struck while crossing Sixth Street in Missoula and suffered severe injuries; Wilson (driver) testified she was blinded by sun glare, slowed, and had changed lanes before the intersection.
Dispute centered on whether Maier was within the unmarked crosswalk at impact; measurements and eyewitness accounts (notably Bridget Smith) conflicted. Smith was the only non-party eyewitness to testify at trial.
Maier moved for partial summary judgment on negligence per se (relying on statutes predicated on pedestrians in marked/unmarked crosswalks); the district court denied the motion, finding a genuine factual dispute about Maier’s location at impact.
Pretrial orders excluded police reports and limited officers’ testimony about eyewitness statements (hearsay), but allowed cross-examination of eyewitnesses about their personal observations; counsel was required to approach the bench before referencing disputed eyewitness statements from reports.
At trial, Maier attempted to impeach Smith with prior inconsistent statements to police; the court curtailed that line of questioning and later refused to allow cross-examination about the prior statements, limiting Maier’s impeachment under M. R. Evid. 613.
During deliberations the jury asked whether a Missoula ordinance sentence granting right-of-way to a pedestrian who has entered the roadway is contingent on entering at a marked/unmarked crosswalk; the court answered that the ordinance applies only to crossings within marked/unmarked crosswalks and directed the jury to the separate statute governing crossings elsewhere; jury returned a defense verdict. The Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment denial, upheld the jury-answer, but reversed and remanded for a new trial because the trial court abused its discretion by barring impeachment of Smith.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
1. Summary judgment on negligence per se — was denial error?	Maier: Wilson’s admissions and reconstruction show no factual dispute — Maier was in unmarked crosswalk, so negligence per se applies.	Wilson: Maier failed to show no genuine issue of material fact; opposing evidence admissible and creates dispute.	Denial affirmed — genuine dispute whether Maier was in crosswalk.
2. Court’s written answer to jury about ordinance scope — was it an abuse of discretion?	Maier: Answer was non‑responsive, referenced different law, and prejudiced her (jury returned verdict shortly after).	Wilson: Answer correctly stated law and did not insert new theory; no prejudice shown.	No abuse — answer was correct and did not prejudice Maier.
3. Exclusion of cross‑examination re: Smith’s prior inconsistent statements — abuse of discretion?	Maier: Rule 613 permits impeachment by prior inconsistent statements; exclusion denied a substantial right and affected outcome.	Wilson: Issue results from Maier’s failure to follow court orders and is not reversible; any error harmless.	Reversed — exclusion was an abuse of discretion and affected Maier’s substantial right; new trial ordered.
4. Remedy sufficiency — was limiting expert testimony adequate?	Maier: Limiting expert testimony did not cure the prejudice from inability to impeach Smith.	Wilson: Expert limitation and other record evidence meant any error was harmless.	Court agreed with Maier — expert limitation insufficient; impeachment exclusion materially affected trial outcome.

Key Cases Cited

Pilgeram v. GreenPoint Mortg. Funding, Inc., 313 P.3d 839 (discussing standard of review for summary judgment)
Stipe v. First Interstate Bank - Polson, 188 P.3d 1063 (view evidence in light most favorable to nonmoving party)
Giambra v. Kelsey, 162 P.3d 134 (negligence per se principles)
VanLuchene v. State, 797 P.2d 932 (elements for negligence per se)
State v. Hawkins, 529 P.2d 1377 (permissible to direct jury to instructions already given)
State v. Dunfee, 114 P.3d 217 (referral to instructions/statute during deliberations permissible when adequate)
Semenza v. Leitzke, 754 P.2d 509 (court may answer jury question with more than yes/no when not introducing new theory)
Simonson v. White, 713 P.2d 983 (abuse of discretion if court’s answer inserts new defense)
Tarlton v. Kaufman, 199 P.3d 263 (prejudice required to reverse jury instruction error)