2:17-cv-02031
D. Ariz.Apr 10, 2019Background
- In 2004 a pipe bomb exploded at Scottsdale’s Diversity Office, severely injuring the director and others; after a multi‑year undercover investigation Dennis Mahon was charged and convicted on three counts relating to the bombing and distribution of explosive‑making information.
- Mahon received concurrent sentences: 40 years on Counts 1 and 2 (conspiracy and malicious damage by explosive) and 33 months on Count 3 (distribution of explosive‑making information).
- Mahon filed an amended 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition raising ineffective‑assistance and other claims; Magistrate Judge Metcalf issued an R&R recommending denial; Mahon objected on four principal grounds asserting counsel was ineffective.
- The contested issues on objection: (1) appellate counsel’s failure to appeal denial of motion to suppress statements made in a police van (Miranda/functional‑equivalent interrogation); (2) appellate counsel’s failure to appeal admission of co‑defendant Daniel’s recorded statements (Confrontation/Bruton); (3) failure to obtain dismissal of Count 3 for entrapment and trial counsel’s withdrawal of an entrapment jury instruction; and (4) appellate counsel’s failure to appeal application of a 12‑level terrorism enhancement at sentencing.
- The district court accepted the R&R, reviewed Mahon’s objections, and denied the § 2255 motion, finding counsel’s choices were reasonable and Mahon failed to show prejudice under Strickland.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Mahon) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Appellate counsel ineffective for not appealing denial of motion to suppress van recordings (Miranda/functional‑equivalent interrogation) | Agents used psychological ploys, placed defendants in a hot wired van for hours, and orchestrated interactions (via Agent Moreland and Daniel) that were the functional equivalent of interrogation; reasonable probability of success on appeal | Officers’ statements were "normally attendant to arrest," the van conditions were promptly remedied and not coercive, defendants expected recording, and no questioning occurred that was likely to elicit incriminating responses | Court held counsel reasonably declined appeal; no Strickland prejudice because interactions did not amount to Miranda interrogation and an appeal was unlikely to succeed |
| 2) Appellate counsel ineffective for not appealing admission of Daniel’s van statements under Confrontation Clause/Bruton | Daniel’s recorded statements implicated Mahon and, absent co‑conspirator theory, Bruton/Larson should have barred their admission | Daniel’s statements were non‑testimonial; Crawford/Davis/Whorton permit admission of non‑testimonial statements and Larson post‑en banc confirms no Confrontation violation | Court held appeal would have failed; statements were non‑testimonial so Confrontation Clause did not bar admission; no Strickland prejudice |
| 3) Entrapment (pretrial dismissal / trial counsel withdrawal of entrapment instruction) | Government induced Mahon through months of pressure by a confidential informant (Rebecca Williams); Mahon lacked predisposition and Count 3 should have been dismissed or an instruction given | Evidence showed Mahon suggested bomb construction, showed little reluctance, and had character/reputation and statements supporting predisposition; counsel reasonably withdrew instruction to avoid permitting rebuttal evidence on Counts 1–2 | Court held entrapment dismissal was not required as factual disputes existed; trial counsel’s tactical withdrawal was reasonable and, even if error, no prejudice because evidence supported predisposition |
| 4) Appellate counsel ineffective for not appealing 12‑level terrorism enhancement (U.S.S.G. § 3A1.4) | Enhancement inappropriate because the conduct did not constitute federal terrorism aimed at influencing federal government (issue ripe for appeal) | Circuits (and Ninth Circuit analogues) interpret § 3A1.4 to apply when offense was calculated to influence or affect government by intimidation or to retaliate; intent to affect municipal government suffices and appellate success was unlikely | Court held counsel reasonably declined appeal; Mahon failed to show a substantial likelihood of a different result on appeal |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (ineffective assistance standard)
- Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (Miranda: "interrogation" and functional equivalent test)
- Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (co‑defendant confession and confrontation right)
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (Confrontation Clause applies to testimonial statements)
- Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (clarifying testimonial vs non‑testimonial statements)
- Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406 (Confrontation Clause inapplicable to non‑testimonial statements)
- United States v. Larson, 495 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. en banc on non‑testimonial statements and confrontation analysis)
- Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540 (entrapment and government‑induced predisposition burden)
- United States v. Mahon, 793 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. decision on Mahon’s direct appeal referenced by the court)
