Mahnke v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
821 F. Supp. 2d 125
D.D.C.2011Background
- Plaintiff Amanda Mahnke was struck by a WMATA bus while crossing at the southeast corner of Connecticut Ave and Florida Ave NW in DC on Sept. 3, 2009.
- Plaintiff alleged multiple injuries from the bus driver’s negligent operation; defendant moved for summary judgment on contributory negligence grounds.
- Plaintiff filed a motion in limine to bar a contributory negligence defense; eleven additional in limine motions were also pending.
- Disputed facts include whether Mahnke looked for oncoming traffic, whether the bus was within her field of vision, and whether the bus driver had a last clear chance to avoid the collision.
- Disputed speed of the bus (plaintiff’s expert up to 30 mph; defendant’s expert around 26–27 mph; other witnesses described varied speeds).
- The court denied summary judgment, finding material facts in dispute and recognizing last clear chance as a potential path to plaintiff’s recovery.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was Mahnke contributorily negligent as a matter of law? | Plaintiff argues disputed sightline and speed facts preclude legal contribution. | Defendant argues Mahnke entered crosswalk without looking, breaching duty. | Summary judgment denied; not a clear, undisputed contributorily negligent case. |
| Does the last clear chance doctrine defeat contributory negligence? | Bus driver had last clear chance to avoid the accident. | No clear last clear chance shown as a matter of law. | Denied; jury must weigh whether driver could have avoided the collision. |
| May plaintiff bar defendant from raising contributory negligence as a defense when negligence per se is argued? | Violations of traffic regulations by WMATA driver render defense inappropriate. | Contributory negligence defense remains available despite potential negligence per se. | Denied; contributory negligence defense remains available even if negligence per se is involved. |
| Is the claimed negligence per se based on traffic regulations properly before the court, and does it preclude contributory negligence? | Unexplained regulatory violations establish per se negligence. | Whether violations occurred is a jury question; per se status not automatic. | Denied; jury must decide regulatory violations; contributory defense remains permissible. |
Key Cases Cited
- Martin v. George Hyman Constr. Co., 395 A.2d 63 (D.C. 1978) (contributory negligence may be unavailable where statute/regulation protects against such injuries)
- Massengale v. Pitts, 737 A.2d 1029 (D.C. 1999) (no merit to claim that traffic regulation violation precludes contributory defense)
- Bowman v. Redding Co., Inc., 449 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (traffic regs clarify elements of due care; do not automatically create liability)
- O’Connor v. District of Columbia, 921 F. Supp. 5 (D.D.C. 1996) (pedestrian duty to look; failure to observe traffic signals may constitute contributory negligence)
- Spain v. McNeal, 337 A.2d 507 (D.C. 1975) (uncontroverted field of vision required for contributory negligence as a matter of law)
- Hall v. Carter, 825 A.2d 954 (D.C. 2003) (explanation of last clear chance doctrine in DC context)