Mahala A. Church v. Accretive Health, Inc., 654 F. App'x 990

Mahala Church sued Accretive Health under the FDCPA after Accretive, acting for Providence Hospital, sent a letter about an alleged hospital debt that omitted certain FDCPA disclosures.
Church alleged emotional upset but no economic damages; she sued to enforce the FDCPA’s disclosure requirements and sought class treatment.
The district court granted summary judgment for Accretive Health, concluding the FDCPA did not apply because the debt was not in default when Accretive obtained it.
Accretive raised, shortly before oral argument, that Church lacked Article III standing under Spokeo because she suffered no concrete, tangible injury.
The Eleventh Circuit first considered standing and held Church alleged a concrete injury: deprivation of the statutory right to required disclosures under the FDCPA.
On the merits the court affirmed the district court: the debt was not in default when obtained by Accretive, so Accretive was not a “debt collector” under the FDCPA and the Act’s disclosure rules did not apply.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Standing — whether Church alleged a concrete injury under Article III	Church argued that the FDCPA creates a substantive right to disclosures and failure to receive them is a concrete injury sufficient for standing	Accretive argued Church’s emotional distress without economic harm is not a sufficiently concrete injury under Spokeo	Held: Church has standing; deprivation of statutorily required disclosures is a concrete, cognizable injury (statutory right elevated to concrete injury)
FDCPA applicability — whether the debt was in default when obtained by Accretive	Church invited the Court to hold a debt can be in default before any collection demand is made	Accretive argued the debt was not in default when it acquired the account; therefore Accretive is exempt from the FDCPA as a non-debt-collector under §1692a(6)(F)	Held: Affirmed district court; the debt was not in default at acquisition, so the FDCPA does not apply to Accretive’s letter

Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982) (tester with no intent to rent may still suffer concrete injury where statute guarantees truthful information)
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (Article III injury-in-fact must be concrete and particularized)
DiMaio v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 520 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2008) (standing is a jurisdictional threshold to be addressed before merits)
AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Nat’l Ass’n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc., 494 F.3d 1356 (11th Cir. 2007) (courts obligated to consider standing sua sponte)
Lodge v. Kondaur Capital Corp., 750 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2014) (FDCPA applies only to persons meeting statutory definition of debt collector)