Magill v. Ford Motor Co.
2016 CO 57
| Colo. | 2016Background
- September 25, 2013 collision in Douglas County, Colorado: John Magill (plaintiff) injured while driving a 2007 Ford Fusion; Magills sued driver Polunci and Ford Motor Company alleging defects in seat/restraint systems (strict liability, negligence, loss of consortium).
- Plaintiffs filed in Denver District Court; Ford (Delaware corporation; principal place of business in Michigan) has a registered agent and conducts sales/marketing in Colorado but does not manufacture cars there.
- Ford moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction (C.R.C.P. 12(b)(2)) or, alternatively, to transfer venue; trial court found Ford subject to general jurisdiction in Colorado and denied venue transfer because Ford’s registered agent is in Denver.
- Colorado Supreme Court granted original review under C.A.R. 21 to resolve whether Daimler controls general jurisdiction over out-of-state corporations doing business in Colorado and whether maintenance of a registered agent makes a foreign corporation a resident for venue.
- The Supreme Court reversed: Ford is not “essentially at home” in Colorado under Daimler; maintaining a registered agent in Denver does not make a foreign corporation a Denver resident; remanded to transfer venue and for trial court to consider specific jurisdiction in an appropriate forum.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Colorado courts have general personal jurisdiction over Ford | Ford’s continuous, systematic business in Colorado (many dealerships, offices, training, litigation history, registered agent) makes it “at home” here | Ford is incorporated in Delaware and has principal place of business in Michigan; Colorado contacts are not unique or comparable to being “at home” | Not at home; general jurisdiction over Ford in Colorado is improper under Daimler |
| Whether specific jurisdiction exists over Ford | (Not decided below; plaintiffs would argue the Fusion and sales/marketing/stream-of-commerce contacts support specific jurisdiction) | Ford argued the accident did not arise from Colorado contacts | Court did not decide; remanded for trial court to evaluate specific jurisdiction in proper venue |
| Whether maintaining a registered agent in Denver makes Ford a resident for venue purposes | Registered agent location makes corporation a resident of that county; venue proper in Denver | Colorado law does not treat registered-agent presence as converting foreign corporation to resident; constitutional and statutory language doesn’t say so | Registered agent does not make Ford a Denver resident; venue in Denver improper |
| Proper venue for the tort action | (Plaintiffs chose Denver) | Venue should be where parties reside or tort occurred; here Douglas County (plaintiffs, accident) or El Paso County (defendant Polunci) | Venue improper in Denver; case must be transferred to appropriate county (Douglas or El Paso) |
Key Cases Cited
- Daimler A.G. v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014) (general-jurisdiction standard: corporation subject to all-purpose jurisdiction only where essentially at home—typically place of incorporation or principal place of business)
- Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011) (reiterates narrow scope of general jurisdiction; contacts must render defendant at home)
- International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (minimum contacts and fair play principles underpin personal jurisdiction analysis)
- Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952) (exceptional circumstances—temporary relocation of a corporation’s operations—can render corporation at home for general jurisdiction)
- World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (stream-of-commerce and related contacts relevant to specific jurisdiction)
- Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (Fourteenth Amendment due process limits state authority over nonresidents)
- Denver Air Ctr. v. Dist. Ct., 839 P.2d 1182 (Colo. 1992) (venue; plaintiff may not select a county unrelated to defendant’s residence, plaintiff’s residence, or where tort occurred)