958 F.3d 1137
11th Cir.2020Background:
- The Robinsons discovered a pervasive brown recluse spider infestation in their home and, after unsuccessful eradication efforts, obtained a homeowners policy from Liberty Mutual.
- The policy covered direct physical loss to property but expressly excluded loss "caused by ... birds, vermin, rodents, or insects."
- Liberty Mutual denied the Robinsons’ claim relying on the insects/vermin exclusion; the Robinsons sued for breach of contract and bad faith.
- The Robinsons alleged the spiders made the home unsafe, could not be eradicated, and thus their loss was covered because brown recluse spiders were neither "insects" nor "vermin."
- The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding brown recluse spiders fall within the ordinary meaning of both "insects" and "vermin."
- The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding (as a matter of law) that under Alabama law the ordinary meaning of the terms includes spiders and that the court properly relied on dictionary definitions.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether brown recluse spiders are "insects" under the policy's ordinary-meaning rule | Robinson: spiders are arachnids (scientifically distinct) and not "insects" | Liberty Mutual: ordinary meaning (dictionaries/popular usage) treats spiders as insects | Court: Under Alabama law, ordinary meaning controls; dictionaries show spiders are commonly understood as "insects"; exclusion applies |
| Whether the court erred by consulting dictionary definitions without a hearing (judicial notice) | Robinson: district court could not take "judicial notice" of definitions without affording a hearing | Liberty Mutual: dictionaries establish legislative facts; Rule 201 permits notice of such generally known, not reasonably questioned facts | Court: Dictionaries answer a question of law (legislative facts); Rule 201 permits their use without a hearing absent a party's request; no error |
Key Cases Cited
- Ga. State Conference of the NAACP v. City of LaGrange, 940 F.3d 627 (11th Cir.) (standard of review for Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals)
- Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir.) (contract interpretation reviewed de novo)
- Safeway Ins. Co. of Ala., Inc. v. Herrera, 912 So. 2d 1140 (Ala.) (give policy terms ordinary meaning; avoid technical definitions)
- Liggans R.V. Ctr. v. John Deere Ins. Co., 575 So. 2d 567 (Ala.) (no technical meanings for policy terms)
- Johnson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 505 So. 2d 362 (Ala.) (ambiguities and exceptions to coverage construed narrowly)
- Carpet Installation & Supplies of Glenco v. Alfa Mut. Ins. Co., 628 So. 2d 560 (Ala.) (dictionary definitions reflect ordinary meaning)
- Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304 (1893) (common-language definitions control over technical botanical classification)
- Marcelle v. S. Fid. Ins. Co., 954 F. Supp. 2d 429 (E.D. La.) (discussing ambiguity of "vermin" for mammals)
- Gregory v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., [citation="611 F. App'x 410"] (9th Cir.) ("vermin" in a policy exclusion included mites, an arachnid)
- Christ Episcopal Church of Bastrop v. Church Ins. Co., 731 So. 2d 1071 (La. Ct. App.) ("vermin" unambiguous as to mice and rats)