Maggard v. Kinney
576 S.W.3d 559
| Mo. Ct. App. | 2019Background
- Dr. Angela Maggard sued Dr. Bruce Kinney for defamation, wrongful use of proceedings, abuse of process, and related claims arising from (a) Kinney's testimony as an expert/witness in a federal malpractice case and (b) grievances and statements Kinney made to the Kentucky Board of Medical Licensure (KBML) and hospital staff.
- Kinney invoked the judicial statements privilege (and referred to precedents treating some disciplinary statements as absolutely privileged) and moved to dismiss; the trial court denied dismissal and refused to stay proceedings.
- Kinney filed an interlocutory appeal claiming the denial of the privilege was immediately appealable under this Court’s collateral-order precedent (Prater) as a form of absolute immunity.
- The Court of Appeals granted a partial stay and held some claims barred by the privilege (extending Botts to KBML proceedings) and remanded others; the decision was fractured.
- On discretionary review the Kentucky Supreme Court considered whether the interlocutory appeal was authorized and whether the judicial statements privilege equates to immunity permitting immediate appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether denial of the judicial statements privilege is immediately appealable under the collateral-order doctrine | Maggard: the Court of Appeals lacked interlocutory jurisdiction; the privilege denial is not a collateral-order immunity denial | Kinney: denial of the privilege is equivalent to denial of absolute immunity and thus immediately appealable under Prater | Held: Not appealable. Collateral-order doctrine does not permit interlocutory appeal for denial of this privilege. |
| Whether the judicial statements privilege is a form of immunity | Maggard: privilege is an evidentiary rule, not immunity freeing a party from litigation burdens | Kinney: privilege functions as absolute immunity from suit for statements made in disciplinary/judicial contexts | Held: Privilege ≠ immunity. Privilege governs admissibility/use of statements; it does not relieve the holder from litigation burdens and so is not an immunity for collateral-order purposes. |
| Whether witness or testimonial immunities (as argued for testimony in the Harless case) warrant immediate appeal | Maggard: witness-immunity interests are personal and do not implicate a substantial public interest justifying collateral-order review | Kinney: (implicitly) testimony immunity should be protected now to avoid irreparable harm | Held: Even if witness immunity applied to specific testimony, it generally does not implicate the kind of substantial public interest that warrants immediate appeal. |
| Precedential effect of Botts (allowing interlocutory appeal re disciplinary statements) | Maggard: Botts was wrongly extended beyond its limited context and should not authorize interlocutory appeals for privileges | Kinney: Botts supports interlocutory review (as Court of Appeals applied it) | Held: Botts is limited; to the extent Botts allowed interlocutory appeals for journalistic judicial-statement privileges generally, it is overruled. Botts remains narrow re: SCR 3.160(4) immunity for KBA actors. |
Key Cases Cited
- Breathitt Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Prater, 292 S.W.3d 883 (Ky. 2009) (recognized narrow collateral-order interlocutory appeal for denial of substantial claim of absolute immunity)
- Commonwealth v. Farmer, 423 S.W.3d 690 (Ky. 2014) (refined collateral-order test: issue must be separable, effectively unreviewable, and implicate a substantial public interest)
- Morgan & Pottinger, Attorneys, P.S.C. v. Botts, 348 S.W.3d 599 (Ky. 2011) (divided decision that permitted interlocutory review in KBA-discipline context; limited by this opinion)
- Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (U.S. 1985) (Supreme Court decision recognizing interlocutory review for certain denials of absolute immunity)
- Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (U.S. 1982) (articulated collateral-order criteria for limited interlocutory appeals)
- Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345 (U.S. 2006) (stressed public-interest limitation on collateral-order doctrine)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (U.S. 2009) (described collateral-order doctrine as narrow and limited)
- Mohawk Indus. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100 (U.S. 2009) (refused interlocutory review for orders compelling disclosure of privileged materials)
- Kelly v. Great Seneca Fin. Corp., 447 F.3d 944 (6th Cir. 2006) (refused collateral-order appeal for witness immunity; noted lack of imperiled public interest)
- Schmitt v. Mann, 163 S.W.2d 281 (Ky. 1942) (described the judicial statements privilege as the prevailing rule in Kentucky)