Magee v. Coca-Cola Refreshments USA, Inc.
143 F. Supp. 3d 464
E.D. La.2015Background
- Plaintiff Emmett Magee, who is legally blind, encountered a Coca‑Cola Glass Front Vendor (GFV) vending machine at a New Orleans bus station and alleged he could not independently use it because it has no non‑visual product display or interface.
- Plaintiff also alleged a prior similar encounter at East Jefferson General Hospital (but that claim would be time‑barred).
- Magee sued Coca‑Cola Refreshments USA, Inc., under Title III of the ADA and sought to represent a nationwide class of legally blind individuals denied access to Coca‑Cola GFVs nationwide.
- Coca‑Cola moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing the GFV is not a "place of public accommodation" and thus Coca‑Cola is not liable under § 12182 because it does not own, lease, or operate the bus station where the incident occurred.
- The court accepted plaintiff’s factual allegations as true for the Rule 12(b)(6) analysis but rejected legal conclusions that lack supporting facts.
- The court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, holding the GFV is not within the statutory categories of "places of public accommodation," so Coca‑Cola is not a proper defendant for the Title III claim as pleaded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether GFV is a "place of public accommodation" under Title III | GFV should be treated as a place of public accommodation so Coca‑Cola can be sued for nationwide relief | GFV is personal property/equipment at a public accommodation; it is not itself a statutory place of public accommodation | GFV is not among the twelve categories in the statute; therefore not a place of public accommodation |
| Whether Coca‑Cola can be liable under § 12182 absent ownership/operation of the facility where the GFV was located | Magee asserts nexus by treating the machine as the accommodation | Coca‑Cola says § 12182 requires the defendant to own/lease/operate the place of public accommodation | Court: § 12182 requires that nexus; because Coca‑Cola did not own/operate the bus station and GFV is not a listed place, claim fails |
| Sufficiency of the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) | Complaint alleges inability to use GFV and seeks injunctive relief and fees; pleads standing to return to the station | Coca‑Cola argues the pleadings rely on legal conclusions and fail to establish a statutory defendant | Court: factual allegations accepted but legal conclusions unsupported; complaint not plausible as to defendant’s liability |
| Class/nationwide relief theory | Seeks nationwide class of legally blind individuals denied access to Coca‑Cola GFVs | Coca‑Cola challenges suitability because no statutory basis to treat GFVs as places of public accommodation | Court dismissed entire complaint, undermining nationwide class claim because the defendant is not a statutory proprietor of the accommodation |
Key Cases Cited
- Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. 2009) (standard for accepting factual allegations on motion to dismiss)
- Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (Supreme Court 2007) (pleading inference standard in motion to dismiss context)
- Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (Supreme Court 1974) (pleading allegations to be accepted as true at motion to dismiss)
- Lovick v. Ritemoney, Ltd., 378 F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 2004) (pleading standards)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court 2009) (legal conclusions not entitled to deference)
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court 2007) (plausibility pleading standard)
- Gentilello v. Rege, 627 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 2010) (motion to dismiss central inquiry)
- Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008) (pleading requirements for claims)
- Plotkin v. IP Axess, Inc., 407 F.3d 690 (5th Cir. 2005) (courts need not accept unwarranted factual inferences)