Madison v. City of Chicago
2017 IL App (1st) 160195
Ill. App. Ct.2017Background
- On July 29, 2010 the City of Chicago wrongfully demolished a building in which Mary Madison had a beneficial interest; Madison sued the City on July 29, 2015.
- Madison pleaded four counts: (I) wrongful demolition under 65 ILCS 5/1-4-7; (II) inverse condemnation; (III) negligence; and (IV) conversion.
- The City moved to dismiss, arguing all claims were time-barred by the Tort Immunity Act’s 1-year limitations period (745 ILCS 10/8-101(a)).
- Madison argued section 2-101(e) of the Tort Immunity Act exempts wrongful-demolition claims from the Act (so the 5-year property damage statute, 735 ILCS 5/13-205, applies) and that her other counts were derivative of the demolition claim.
- The trial court granted the City’s motion; Madison appealed. The appellate court reversed dismissal of Count I (wrongful demolition) and affirmed dismissal of Counts II–IV.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a wrongful-demolition claim under 65 ILCS 5/1-4-7 is exempt from the Tort Immunity Act’s 1-year limitations period | Section 2-101(e) exempts demolition claims from the Act, so the five-year property-damage statute (735 ILCS 5/13-205) applies | Section 2-101 does not exempt demolition claims from the Act’s procedural limitations; earlier precedent (Hapeniewski I) treated the Act’s limitations as applying | Court held §2-101 exempts demolition claims from the Tort Immunity Act, so the 5-year limitations period governs (reversed dismissal of Count I) |
| Whether the distinction between substantive and procedural provisions of the Tort Immunity Act saves the Act’s 1-year limit for demolition claims | N/A for this precise argument; Madison relied on Raintree Homes’ broad reading of §2-101 | City urged the older substance/procedure distinction (Hapeniewski I et al.) should control and preserve the 1-year rule | Court rejected the substance/procedure distinction, applying Raintree Homes’ reasoning that §2-101 excludes enumerated claims from the Act’s protections, including its time bar |
| Whether the 2003 amendment to §8-101(b) (mentioning breach of contract in patient-care context) shows legislature intended a substance/procedure split | N/A | The City argued the amendment implies limitations still apply to some §2-101 categories | Court found the amendment addressed uniformity in medical-malpractice timing and does not support a substance/procedure distinction |
| Whether Counts II–IV (inverse condemnation, negligence, conversion) are exempt because they are derivative of the demolition claim | Counts are derivative of the demolition claim and thus also exempt under §2-101 | Counts II–IV are not listed in §2-101 and remain subject to the Tort Immunity Act’s 1-year limit | Court rejected Madison’s derivative theory and affirmed dismissal of Counts II–IV as time-barred |
Key Cases Cited
- Hapeniewski v. City of Chicago Heights, 147 Ill. App. 3d 528 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (earlier appellate decision applying Tort Immunity Act limitations to demolition claims)
- Hapeniewski v. City of Chicago Heights, 484 U.S. 806 (U.S. 1987) (U.S. Supreme Court vacated earlier judgment and remanded for further consideration on federal civil-rights aspect)
- Raintree Homes, Inc. v. Village of Long Grove, 209 Ill. 2d 248 (Ill. 2004) (supreme court treated §2-101 exclusions broadly, holding claims for non-damages relief are excluded from the Act)
- Hecko v. City of Chicago, 25 Ill. App. 3d 572 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) (earlier case treating §2-101(e) as eliminating governmental immunity for demolition actions re: notice requirement)
- Cooper v. Bi-State Development Agency, 158 Ill. App. 3d 19 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (applied Tort Immunity Act notice and limitations to common-carrier claims and rejected substance/procedure split)
- Slaughter v. Rock Island County Metropolitan Mass Transit District, 275 Ill. App. 3d 873 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (applied one-year limit and notice requirements to transit-district claims following Cooper)