Madison at Soho II Condominium Association v. Devo Acquisition Enterprises, LLC, 198 So. 3d 1111

Madison at SoHo II Condominium Association sued Devo Acquisition Enterprises for $40,645.70 in unpaid condominium assessments and related fees after Devo acquired a delinquent unit.
Devo sent a $2,412 check expressly tendered as an offer of accord and satisfaction; the Association initially rejected the offer but subsequently deposited the check.
Devo argued that deposit of the check constituted accord and satisfaction under Fla. Stat. § 673.3111 and sought summary judgment; the trial court granted summary judgment for Devo, relying on this court's decision in St. Croix Lane Trust.
This court had earlier held in St. Croix Lane Trust that § 718.116(3) did not preclude accord and satisfaction despite language about "restrictive endorsement."
During the pendency of this appeal the legislature amended § 718.116(3) to state explicitly that the statutory payment priority applies "notwithstanding s. 673.3111, any purported accord and satisfaction, or any restrictive endorsement," and declared the amendment was "intended to clarify existing law."
The Second District reconsidered St. Croix Lane Trust in light of the legislative clarification, concluded the legislature intended to preclude accord and satisfaction when § 718.116(3) (and substantially identical condominium-declaration clauses) applies, reversed the summary judgment for Devo, and remanded.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether an association's deposit of a check tendered as full satisfaction effects accord and satisfaction despite § 718.116(3) and a declaration clause mirroring it	Association: § 718.116(3) and the identical Declaration clause control payment application and preclude accord and satisfaction	Devo: Deposit of the check constituted accord and satisfaction under § 673.3111; St. Croix Lane Trust supports this result	Held: Legislature's subsequent clarifying amendment shows § 718.116(3) was intended to apply notwithstanding accord and satisfaction; deposit did not create accord and satisfaction
Whether a court may rely on a legislative amendment enacted during appeal as an interpretation of the pre‑amended statute rather than a substantive, retroactive change	Association: The amendment clarifies legislative intent and may be used to interpret the pre‑amended statute	Devo: Relying on the amendment would be impermissible retroactive application and unfair because St. Croix Lane Trust was binding when trial court ruled	Held: Courts may consider a prompt post‑decision legislative amendment as a clarification of the original statute (recent controversy rule); this justifies revisiting and abrogating St. Croix Lane Trust

St. Croix Lane Trust v. St. Croix at Pelican Marsh Condominium Ass'n, 144 So. 3d 639 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (prior Second District decision interpreting § 718.116(3) as not precluding accord and satisfaction)
Ivey v. Chicago Ins. Co., 410 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 1982) (courts may consider legislative amendments shortly after controversy as clarifying intent)
Lowry v. Parole & Prob. Comm'n, 473 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 1985) (recent controversy rule for legislative clarifications)
Finley v. Scott, 707 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. 1998) (legislative amendment soon after controversy can be treated as interpretation)
Leftwich v. Florida Dep't of Corr., 148 So. 3d 79 (Fla. 2014) (distinguishing retroactivity inquiry from recent controversy rule)
Essex Ins. Co. v. Integrated Drainage Sols., Inc., 124 So. 3d 947 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (legislative amendment construed as interpretation when enacted shortly after controversy)
Ocean Two Condominium Ass'n v. Kliger, 983 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (third district decision potentially reading § 718.116(3) to bar accord and satisfaction)
Hannah v. James A. Ryder Corp., 380 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (accord and satisfaction occurs when a payment is accepted on the express condition it is full satisfaction)