Madetzke v. Dooley, 912 N.W.2d 350

Madetzke was indicted for second-degree robbery and grand theft; state filed habitual-criminal information alleging four prior felonies and cited SDCL 22-7-8 (crime-of-violence enhancement).
Plea deal: Madetzke pleaded guilty to second-degree robbery as a Class 4 felony, admitted four prior felonies, and the State agreed to seek enhancement under the nonviolent habitual statute (SDCL 22-7-8.1); grand-theft charge dropped; State recommended a 20-year maximum.
At sentencing Judge Zell imposed 25 years with 5 years suspended (effective 20 years), and mistakenly advised Madetzke he could be parole-eligible after about 8 years based on a nonviolent calculation.
Because second-degree robbery is a crime of violence for parole purposes, actual parole eligibility requires serving 65% (about 13 years) rather than 40% (about 8 years); neither defense counsel nor the State corrected the judge’s calculation at sentencing.
Madetzke filed a habeas petition arguing ineffective assistance of counsel for (1) not moving to correct the habitual-criminal information’s implication that a prior conviction was violent, and (2) failing to correct the judge’s parole-eligibility miscalculation. The habeas court denied relief and the Supreme Court of South Dakota affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether counsel was ineffective for not moving to correct the habitual-criminal information’s implication that a prior felony was violent	Madetzke: counsel should have challenged the information; he would not have pled guilty if exposed to life-maximum risk	State: counsel negotiated a favorable plea resolving the dispute; petitioner failed to prove his priors were nonviolent	Court: Denied relief — petitioner failed to prove prejudice or that priors were nonviolent; no showing the challenge would have succeeded
Whether counsel was ineffective for not correcting the judge’s parole-eligibility calculation at sentencing	Madetzke: judge imposed sentence based on mistaken parole estimate; counsel should have corrected it and sentence should be vacated	State: parole eligibility is an executive matter and judges’ advisements are only estimates; counsel reasonably relied on that; no evidence judge would have imposed a different sentence	Court: Denied relief — parole estimate not part of sentence; petitioner failed to show prejudice or that sentence would have differed

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishes performance and prejudice standards for ineffective assistance of counsel)
McDonough v. Weber, 859 N.W.2d 26 (S.D. 2015) (review standards for habeas and discussion of ineffective assistance in South Dakota)
State v. Semrad, 794 N.W.2d 760 (S.D. 2011) (parole eligibility advisory is not part of judicial sentence)
Acker v. Adamson, 293 N.W. 83 (S.D. 1940) (habeas corpus limited to radical defects rendering judgment void)
Ramos v. Weber, 616 N.W.2d 88 (S.D. 2000) (sentencing judge may not testify in subsequent habeas proceedings)