Mader v. United States
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18563
| 8th Cir. | 2011Background
- Ms. Mader, purported Personal Representative of Robert L. Mader, submitted Standard Form 95 to the VA on August 3, 2006 seeking wrongful death damages under FTCA, but failed to include evidence of authority to act for the beneficiaries.
- The VA requested evidence of Ms. Mader’s status as personal representative; no response was provided, and the VA ultimately denied the claim on the merits and/or for lack of authority.
- Ms. Mader later filed a wrongful death FTCA action in district court in March 2008; the court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under § 2675(a) because the claim was not properly presented with authority evidence.
- An en banc panel affirmed the district court, holding that § 2675(a)’s presentment requirement includes evidence of authority to act on behalf of beneficiaries.
- The court reasoned Nebraska’s wrongful death statute confines the action to the personal representative for the exclusive benefit of specified beneficiaries, and Ms. Mader’s appointment had terminated before the claim was presented.
- The dissent argued that the evidence-of-authority requirement is regulatory, not statutory, and should not govern jurisdiction; it addressed standing separately.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does § 2675(a) require evidence of authority to act for beneficiaries? | Mader: no additional authority proof required beyond notice and damages. | Government: authority evidence is required for proper presentment. | Yes; authority evidence required for presentment. |
| Is § 2675(a) presentment a jurisdictional prerequisite? | Not jurisdictional; ordinary claim-processing rule. | Presentment is jurisdictional to FTCA suit. | Jurisdictional prerequisite. |
| Does Ms. Mader have standing to sue for Nebraska wrongful death under FTCA? | Beneficiary standing via Nebraska statute supports suit. | Terminated appointment prevents standing. | Ms. Mader lacks standing; disposition on standing. |
| Does 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a) regulate presentment or merely supplement the statute? | Regulation is optional guidance; statute controls. | Regulation reflects and enforces presentment requirements. | Regulation supports the statutory interpretation; majority opinion affirmed. |
Key Cases Cited
- McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106 (U.S. 1993) (interpreting § 2675(a) exhaustion before suit; strict adherence encouraged)
- Lunsford v. United States, 570 F.2d 221 (8th Cir. 1977) (presentment includes authority to present claims on behalf of unnamed class)
- Farmers State Savings Bank v. Farmers Home Administration, 866 F.2d 276 (8th Cir. 1989) (minimal notice: sufficient information and amount of damages suffice)
- Kanar v. United States, 118 F.3d 527 (7th Cir. 1997) (authority of presentment grounded in regulation, not statute)
- Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197 (U.S. 2011) (jurisdictional labeling of claim-processing rules; context controls)