33 WAP 2019
Pa.Nov 18, 2020Background
- Steven Mader suffered catastrophic electrical burns to his feet requiring multiple invasive surgeries and eventual partial amputation of both feet.
- At trial a jury awarded zero noneconomic damages (pain and suffering) despite uncontradicted evidence of severe pain and invasive future treatment; it awarded some other damages (including medical expenses) roughly matching defendant Duquesne Light Company’s expert.
- The trial court concluded the verdict was inconsistent and ordered a new trial on all damages (noneconomic, past/future lost earning capacity, and past/future medical expenses).
- The Superior Court’s remand (affirming in part and reversing in part) was before the Supreme Court; the majority permitted a new trial on noneconomic damages and lost earning capacity but not on medical damages, adopting a new "fairly determined / not intertwined" framework for partial remands.
- Justice Mundy dissented, arguing the trial court did not abuse its discretion and that all damages are necessarily intertwined in catastrophic-injury cases, so a new trial on all damages (including medical expenses) should be affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Mader) | Defendant's Argument (Duquesne) | Held (Justice Mundy dissent) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper standard of review for ordering a new trial | Trial court has broad discretion; appellate review is for abuse of discretion (manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary, or not supported by record) | Court should limit remands under a narrower test the majority articulated | Apply traditional abuse-of-discretion standard; trial court acted within it |
| Whether new trial on noneconomic damages and lost earning capacity was warranted | Zero award for pain and suffering "shocks the conscience" given catastrophic injuries and invasive surgeries; taints other damage awards | Some awards (e.g., medical) were fairly determined and independent, so remand should be limited | New trial on these damages was appropriate; jury’s zero for pain undermined confidence in overall damages determination |
| Whether past and future medical expenses must be retried | Medical treatment and its costs are intertwined with pain and suffering; jury must hear treatment evidence to assess noneconomic damages | Past medical expenses were stipulated/fixed; future medical award approximated defense expert and thus need not be retried | Medical expenses are intertwined with pain and suffering here; trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering retrial on medical damages |
| Use of the majority’s new "fairly determined / not intertwined" standard (and reliance on McNeil) | The new test is novel, improperly narrows trial-court discretion, and McNeil is inapposite | Majority may justify limiting remand by discerning which awards are "fairly determined" and independent | Rejects the new standard; McNeil (res judicata asbestos case) is not a proper analog; trial court’s broader remedial discretion should control |
Key Cases Cited
- Morrison v. Commonwealth, Department of Public Welfare, 646 A.2d 565 (Pa. 1994) (standard for appellate review of discretionary trial-court rulings)
- Coker v. S.M. Flickinger Co., Inc., 625 A.2d 1181 (Pa. 1993) (defining abuse of discretion standard)
- Dornan v. McCarthy, 195 A.2d 520 (Pa. 1963) (new trial may be required to achieve justice where verdict is unjust)
- Kiser v. Schulte, 648 A.2d 1 (Pa. 1994) (jury verdict may be set aside if it bears no reasonable relation to plaintiff’s loss)
- Hobbs v. Ryce, 769 A.2d 469 (Pa. Super. 2000) (medical expenses and pain and suffering are often intertwined; vacating molded verdict where both must be retried)
- McNeil v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 680 A.2d 1145 (Pa. 1996) (res judicata context relied on by majority; dissent finds it inapplicable here)