Madelon Brogdon v. Town of Tremont Et Al., 2026 ME 56

Brogdon owns about eighteen acres in Tremont, with an undeveloped rear portion in the RB zone and a front portion in the CFMA zone containing an existing residence. 1
She sought to build a campground on the RB portion and access it via an existing way crossing the CFMA zone to the residence. 2
The Planning Board twice denied the application, ultimately finding the way was a driveway serving a residence and that converting it to campground access would expand a nonconforming use. 3
On Brogdon's second appeal, the Superior Court/BCD vacated the denial and ordered the Board to approve the application and direct issuance of a permit. 4
The Intervenors appealed, arguing the court improperly substituted its judgment and the Board reasonably found the LUO prohibited the proposed access. 5
The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the BCD judgment and remanded for entry of judgment affirming the Board's denial. 6

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was the interlocutory appeal ripe? 7	Brogdon sought final judicial relief after remand.	The order was interlocutory and nonfinal.	Yes; only ministerial action remained after the court ordered approval. 8
Was the way a trail under the LUO? 9	Brogdon said the way could qualify as a trail.	The paved residential way was not a trail.	No; the Board reasonably found it was not a trail. 10
Was the way a road under the LUO? 11	Brogdon argued the way was a road, not a driveway.	The way was a driveway and road definitions exclude driveways.	No; substantial evidence supported finding it was a driveway, not a road. 12
Did the Board reasonably find a driveway expansion? 13	Brogdon claimed the record showed the way exceeded 500 feet.	Brogdon's own plans and evidence showed a driveway serving one residence.	Yes; the Board's driveway finding was supported by substantial evidence. 14
Did the Board have to decide the similar-use argument? 15	Brogdon said the Board should have considered similar use.	CEO approval, not Board approval, was required and Brogdon never sought it.	No; the similar-use theory did not require reversal. 16

Raposa v. Town of York, 234 A.3d 206 (Me. 2020) (record support for Rule 80B fact statements 17)
Rockland Plaza Realty Corp. v. City of Rockland, 772 A.2d 256 (Me. 2001) (ministerial-act exception permits interlocutory review 18)
Adelman v. Town of Baldwin, 750 A.2d 577 (Me. 2000) (appellate review focuses on the municipal board decision 19)
Tominsky v. Town of Ogunquit, 294 A.3d 142 (Me. 2023) (standard of deference for municipal factfinding and mixed questions 20)
Stiff v. Town of Belgrade, 322 A.3d 1167 (Me. 2024) (deference on mixed questions depends on factual character 21)
Gerald v. Town of York, 589 A.2d 1272 (Me. 1991) (ordinances are construed reasonably in context 22)
DeSomma v. Town of Casco, 755 A.2d 485 (Me. 2000) (undefined ordinance terms get common meaning 23)
Your Home, Inc. v. City of Portland, 432 A.2d 1250 (Me. 1981) (similar uses may not be arbitrarily excluded when ordinance is silent 24)