Madar v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 918 F.3d 120

Background

Petitioner Jozef Madar, born in Czechoslovakia in 1964, seeks a declaration that he is a U.S. citizen based on citizenship transmitted from his father, Jozef Madar, Sr.
Madar, Sr. was born in 1940 to Julianne Cikovsky (born in Youngstown, Ohio) but lived his entire life in Czechoslovakia/Slovakia and never lived in the U.S.
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, a U.S. citizen parent must have been physically present in the U.S. for specified periods to transmit citizenship to a child born abroad; Madar, Sr. admitted he did not meet those physical-presence requirements.
Madar argues his father constructively satisfied the physical-presence requirement (relying on the constructive physical presence doctrine and Matter of Navarrete) because communist-era Czechoslovakia prevented physical compliance, and thus citizenship transmitted to Madar.
The district court denied Madar’s § 2241 claim, holding that even if Madar, Sr. constructively retained citizenship, constructive physical presence cannot be applied to transmit citizenship absent U.S. government error; Madar appealed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether constructive physical presence can substitute for statutory physical-presence to allow transmission of citizenship to a child born abroad under the 1952 Act	Madar: Navarrete and equitable constructive-presence doctrine allow treating his father as having satisfied presence, so citizenship transmitted	Government: Statute’s text limits exceptions to military/service or government employment; courts may not add a broad equitable exception absent government error	Held: No — constructive physical presence cannot be used to transmit citizenship under the 1952 Act; statutory exceptions are exclusive
Whether Matter of Navarrete controls and supports transmission here	Madar: Navarrete remains good law and requires similar treatment	Government: Navarrete turned on a U.S. government error; it’s limited to that context and not broadly applicable	Held: Navarrete inapplicable — Navarrete involved U.S. official error; no such error here
Whether Madar’s equal protection rights were violated by differing treatment from Navarrete	Madar: District Court treated him differently than Navarrete petitioner	Government: Cases are not similarly situated because Navarrete involved government error; no intentional differential treatment without rational basis	Held: No equal protection violation — not similarly situated; claim fails
Proper statutory construction of the 1952 Act’s physical-presence exceptions	Madar: Courts should recognize equitable/circumstances-beyond-control exception	Government: Interpretive canons and precedent require adherence to the Act’s expressly enumerated exceptions only	Held: Court enforces plain statutory text and declines to read additional equitable exceptions

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Green, 898 F.3d 315 (3d Cir.) (reviewing de novo legal conclusions)
Gross v. FBL Financial Services, 557 U.S. 167 (statutory interpretation starts with plain language)
Engine Manufacturers Ass’n v. South Coast Air Quality Management Dist., 541 U.S. 246 (same canon of statutory interpretation)
Runnett v. Shultz, 901 F.2d 782 (9th Cir.) (applicable law is statute in effect at child’s birth; distinguishes retention v. transmission)
Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (U.S. citizens’ loss of citizenship and related doctrines)
Tullius v. Albright, 240 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir.) (refusing to extend constructive-presence doctrine to transmission absent government error)
Drozd v. I.N.S., 155 F.3d 81 (2d Cir.) (declining to read additional exceptions into physical-presence requirements)
I.N.S. v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183 (context on legislative changes tightening physical-presence/residence requirements)
Newark Cab Ass’n v. City of Newark, 901 F.3d 146 (3d Cir.) (class-of-one equal protection standard)
Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225 (3d Cir.) (class-of-one equal protection elements)