MAD Properties, LLC v. County of Augusta, 910 S.E.2d 42

MAD Properties, LLC operated a vehicle repair and sales business on its property in Augusta County, Virginia, which had a longstanding use predating county zoning ordinances.
Augusta County approved an administrative permit in 2017, allowing vehicle sales under certain zoning restrictions that prohibited outside storage of inoperable vehicles without a specific permit.
The County issued repeated zoning violation notices to MAD Properties in 2021 and 2022 for the alleged outdoor storage of inoperable vehicles; some violations were not appealed to the Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA).
The County subsequently filed suit for injunctive relief, asking the court to bar MAD Properties from storing inoperable vehicles and to enforce compliance at MAD Properties' expense.
At trial, MAD Properties asserted affirmative defenses of grandfathered (pre-existing) use and claimed it corrected the cited violations.
The circuit court ruled for the County, holding MAD Properties barred from raising these affirmative defenses based on the 'thing-decided doctrine,' which precludes relitigation of administrative zoning decisions not timely appealed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does the "thing-decided doctrine" bar MAD Properties' affirmative defenses in this zoning case?	County argued failure to timely appeal past violation notices means those violations are conclusively resolved, barring later defenses.	MAD Properties argued it corrected violations and has a grandfathered use that should be considered.	No: The Court held the doctrine is not so broad as to bar all affirmative defenses, especially when violations may have been corrected or pre-existing nonconforming use is asserted.
Interpretation of zoning ordinance/applicability to parking and "inoperable vehicles"	County claimed inoperable vehicles were openly stored, violating permit and ordinance; site plan restricted parking.	MAD Properties contended site plan did not restrict vehicle service parking; operable vehicles should not be restricted.	Partly for MAD Properties: The permit/site plan did not restrict parking for vehicle service uses, but inoperable vehicle storage remains restricted.
Are "inoperable vehicles" and "vehicles awaiting repair" distinct under the ordinance?	County argued inoperable vehicles, even if awaiting repair, must meet ordinance requirements for storage.	MAD Properties argued “awaiting repair” vehicles should be exempt from inoperable vehicle restrictions.	The Court agreed with the County that "inoperable vehicles" is a distinct, defined category and vehicles awaiting repair could be in violation if also inoperable.

Gayton Triangle Land Co. v. Bd. of Supervisors of Henrico Cnty., 216 Va. 764 (Va. 1976) (establishes requirement to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial review in zoning disputes)
Lilly v. Caroline County, 259 Va. 291 (Va. 2000) (holding that failure to appeal zoning administrator decisions makes those decisions final and unchallengeable)
Dick Kelly Enterprises v. City of Norfolk, 243 Va. 373 (Va. 1992) (affirming that failure to appeal zoning violations can bar certain defenses, but limited to cases where use was unlawful from inception)
Bragg Hill Corp. v. City of Fredericksburg, 297 Va. 566 (Va. 2019) (reiterates exhaustion of administrative remedies in zoning vested rights context)
Gwinn v. Alward, 235 Va. 616 (Va. 1988) (failure to appeal zoning violations bars collateral attack on the administrative decision)
Appalachian Power Co. v. John Stewart Walker, Inc., 214 Va. 524 (Va. 1974) (res judicata applies to administrative determinations only when ordinary elements of issue preclusion are present)
Montgomery v. Columbia Knoll Condominium Council, 231 Va. 437 (Va. 1986) (defining "repair" in the context of property)
Herrington v. City of Virginia Beach, 71 Va. App. 656 (Va. Ct. App. 2020) (principles for interpreting zoning ordinances)