Mackle Vincent Shelton v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 17992

Florida prisoner challenges Florida’s Act as amended § 893.101 on due process grounds after AEDPA review standards apply.
Act removed knowledge of illicit nature as an element for drug offenses but preserves knowledge of presence; created permissive presumption of knowledge when affirmative defense is raised.
Florida Supreme Court upheld facial constitutionality, interpreting the Act as not removing knowledge of presence as an element and allowing the affirmative defense.
Shelton was convicted in 2005 for delivery of cocaine after amendment; jury was not instructed on illicit-knowledge element.
District court granted relief on facial unconstitutionality; the State appealed seeking AEDPA-deferential review of state-court adjudication; this court reverses and restores deference.
This court ultimately reverses the district court’s habeas grant, concluding no AEDPA violation or unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether AEDPA deferential review applies to Shelton’s facial challenge.	Shelton (petitioner) argues district court correctly found facial unconstitutionality.	State contends state court adjudication was entitled to AEDPA deference.	AEDPA deferential standard applies; deference to state court maintained.
Whether Florida’s partial elimination of mens rea violates due process.	Shelton asserts due process forbids eliminating mens rea for analogous offenses.	State argues legislature may declare offenses and limit mental-state elements.	No clear Supreme Court precedent required reversal; statute not unconstitutionally vague under current precedent.
Whether the district court erred in treating the state court decision as non-merits adjudication.	Shelton contends state decision was not adjudicated on the merits due to per curiam affirmance.	State maintains AEDPA deference applies because the Florida court decision was on the merits.	Under applicable doctrine, state adjudication deemed merits-based; deference preserved.
What standard governs review of state-court decisions under AEDPA here.	Shelton seeks independent federal-law analysis beyond AEDPA scope.	State relies on Harrington and related cases to support deference.	The review is AEDPA-based; no Supreme Court precedent mandates contrary result.

Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957) (due process failure where notice of offense lacking)
Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985) (knowledge element not always required; knowledge-related defenses explored)
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (constitutional limitations beyond which states may not go in mens rea considerations)
Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994) (recognizes constitutional boundaries in defining elements of offense)
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952) (classic mens rea discussion on mental-state elements)
X-Citement Video, Inc. v. United States, 513 U.S. 64 (1994) (knowledge requirements and knowledge-element discussions in crime statutes)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (AEDPA deference standard for state-court adjudications)