444 F.Supp.3d 1094
N.D. Cal.2020Background:
- In June 2018 Mackie told sheriff deputies her neighbor Millar had entered her home uninvited and later threatened her; deputies responded but did not prepare a report or take protective measures.
- On August 15, 2018 Deputy Gonzalez located Millar, aggressively confronted/taunted him (including pounding windows, insulting masculinity, and referencing Mackie), then left without calling backup.
- Shortly after Gonzalez left, Millar returned armed, battered Mackie’s door, fired through a bathroom door, and wounded Mackie; Millar was later arrested by a SWAT team.
- Plaintiffs sued Deputy Gonzalez, the County of Santa Cruz, and the Santa Cruz County Sheriff’s Office (among others), alleging: (1) a § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment claim under the state-created danger theory; (2) Monell liability for failure to train/supervise; and (3) common-law negligence and vicarious liability.
- The Named County Defendants moved to dismiss; the court denied the motion, holding the SAC plausibly pleaded the state-created danger claim, Monell liability, and that state-law immunities did not bar the negligence claim.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Deputy Gonzalez’s conduct satisfies the § 1983 "state-created danger" exception | Gonzalez’s confrontation and taunting of Millar, together with leaving without protection, affirmatively increased a foreseeable risk and showed deliberate indifference | Gonzalez did not create the danger; at most he increased verbal provocation and had no actual knowledge Millar was armed or would use lethal force | Denied: SAC plausibly alleges Gonzalez affirmatively increased a particularized danger, that the resulting injury was foreseeable, and that Gonzalez acted with deliberate indifference |
| Whether County and Sheriff’s Office are liable under Monell for failure to train/supervise | County had policies/practices showing deliberate indifference to dangerous interactions with violent or mentally unstable individuals; failure to train was the moving force | Plaintiffs failed to plead an underlying constitutional violation or a specific policy/practice causing the injury | Denied: because the court found a plausible underlying § 1983 violation and that the SAC alleges factual specifics re: training/supervision sufficient to survive dismissal under AE/Starr standard |
| Whether Plaintiffs’ state-law negligence and vicarious-liability claims survive public-entity immunities (Cal. Gov. Code § 815/815.2) | Plaintiffs sue Gonzalez individually for negligence and the entities vicariously under § 815.2; vicarious liability is permitted absent a specific statutory bar | County argues general immunity under § 815 bars claims against a public entity | Denied as to § 815: § 815 bars direct liability but § 815.2 permits vicarious liability for employee negligence, so the negligence pleading survives |
| Whether other statutory immunities (discretionary-act immunity § 820.2 and provisions §§ 845, 846, 855.6/855.8, etc.) bar negligence | Plaintiffs’ negligence theory focuses on Gonzalez’s affirmative conduct (provoking and leaving) and not on policy decisions or failures to arrest/diagnose | Defendants invoke § 820.2 discretionary-act immunity and various other statutory immunities shielding police failures to act, arrest, or diagnose mental illness | Denied: court finds § 820.2 inapplicable because the claim targets operational/ministerial negligence after Gonzalez chose to engage; other cited statutes do not cover the alleged affirmative, risk-increasing conduct |
Key Cases Cited
- DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (U.S. 1989) (state generally not liable for failure to protect absent special relationship or state-created danger)
- Kennedy v. City of Ridgefield, 439 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 2006) (elements of state-created danger doctrine)
- Hernandez v. City of San Jose, 897 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2018) (state-created danger requires a particularized, actual danger and foreseeability analysis)
- Martinez v. City of Clovis, 943 F.3d 1260 (9th Cir. 2019) (officers can increase danger and create liability under state-created danger)
- Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989) (foreseeability inquiry considers general increased risk rather than exact injury)
- Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (U.S. 1978) (municipal liability for unconstitutional policy/practice)
- AE v. County of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631 (9th Cir. 2012) (Monell pleading governed by Starr standard; bare allegations insufficient)
- Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2011) (factual allegations must plausibly suggest entitlement to relief)
- Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coord. Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (U.S. 1993) (Monell claims not subject to heightened pleading beyond Rule 8, but must meet Iqbal/Twombly framework)
- Mann v. State of California, 70 Cal. App. 3d 773 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (discretionary-act immunity does not shield ministerial/operational negligent acts once discretionary decision is made)
- Lugtu v. California Highway Patrol, 26 Cal. 4th 703 (Cal. 2001) (officer may be liable for affirmative acts that place plaintiffs in greater danger)
- Zelig v. County of Los Angeles, 27 Cal. 4th 1112 (Cal. 2002) (similar principle on affirmative acts increasing risk)