Mack v. Yost
979 F. Supp. 2d 639
W.D. Pa.2013Background
- Charles Mack, a Muslim inmate at FCI Loretto, worked in the commissary and alleges a supervisor slapped him, put a sticker reading “I LOVE BACON” on his back, and made anti-Muslim remarks; he was fired days later.
- Mack orally complained to supervisors and later filed formal administrative grievances (BP-8/BP-9 through BP-11) and then sued under Bivens and RLUIPA seeking damages and injunctive relief.
- Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing failure to state constitutional or statutory claims, lack of exhaustion (in part), and immunity defenses.
- The Court treated the motion under Rule 12(b)(6), applied the Iqbal/Twombly plausibility framework, and considered exhaustion under the PLRA.
- The Court dismissed: (1) any equal protection claim for failure to identify similarly situated non-Muslim comparators; (2) retaliation claim because Mack’s pre-termination oral complaint to staff was not a constitutionally protected petition; (3) RLUIPA claim because RLUIPA does not apply to the federal government; and (4) potential RFRA/free-exercise claims because Mack did not allege a substantial burden or intentional official discrimination sufficient to state a claim. The amended complaint was dismissed with prejudice.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Equal protection (Fifth Amendment) | Mack was singled out and harassed because of his Muslim faith | Mack failed to identify any similarly situated non-Muslim treated differently | Dismissed — no similarly situated comparator alleged; bare harassment insufficient |
| Retaliation (First Amendment) | Mack was fired in retaliation for complaining orally to supervisors about harassment | Oral, informal complaints before filing administrative grievances are not constitutionally protected petitioning; no protected conduct | Dismissed — oral complaint to a guard is not protected petitioning for redress; no protected activity shown |
| RLUIPA claim | Religious discrimination and hostile work environment in commissary | RLUIPA does not apply to federal prisons; PRLA exhaustion defense asserted | Dismissed — RLUIPA inapplicable to federal government; exhaustion adequate for claims raised but RLUIPA unavailable |
| Free exercise / RFRA theories | Intentional harassment and religiously offensive conduct support free-exercise or RFRA relief | No substantial burden on religious exercise; prison allowed prayer accommodations and halal items; RFRA applies to federal government but plaintiff did not allege substantial burden or intentional government interference | Dismissed — no substantial burden alleged and no intentional government action preventing religious exercise; RFRA claim fails on the facts |
Key Cases Cited
- Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (recognition of a damages cause of action against federal officers for constitutional violations)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (pleading standard: plausibility and separation of factual allegations from legal conclusions)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (plausibility pleading standard)
- Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203 (applying Twombly/Iqbal in the Third Circuit)
- Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224 (pleading and amendment principles in Section 1983 context)
- Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330 (burden-shifting in prisoner retaliation claims)
- Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (PLRA exhaustion requirements)
- Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (exhaustion is mandatory; failure to exhaust bars suit)
- Graham v. Henderson, 89 F.3d 75 (filing grievances is protected petitioning for redress in prisoner-retaliation context)
- Franco v. Kelly, 854 F.2d 584 (right to petition extends to administrative grievance procedures)
- Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346 (grievance filing is protected activity; cited on protections for formal grievances)
- City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (RFRA unconstitutional as applied to states)
- Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (RFRA viability against the federal government)
- Brown v. Borough of Mahaffey, 35 F.3d 846 (intentional government obstruction of religious exercise permits free-exercise claim without RFRA substantial-burden analysis)
