2019 Ohio 5427
Ohio Ct. App.2019Background
- Toledo enacted Ord. 167-17 (TMC Chap. 1760) requiring pre-1978 single-family, duplex and 1–4 unit rental dwelling units and family child care homes to obtain a "Lead-Safe Certificate" (inspections, reports, fees) on a staged timetable; noncompliance exposed owners to daily fines.
- The City and the Toledo‑Lucas County Health District executed a contract (citing R.C. 3709.281) delegating enforcement and related services to the District; fees were to fund enforcement and the agreement ran through 2022 with renewals.
- Plaintiffs (Cheryl Mack and Property Investor’s Network) sued for permanent injunction arguing the District lacked statutory authority to enforce the ordinance, the ordinance improperly delegated legislative power, and Equal Protection was violated by the unit-count classifications and an overbroad definition of "Owner."
- The trial court granted a permanent injunction, finding R.C. 3709.281 did not permit the District to enforce the municipal ordinance and that the ordinance violated equal protection; it later awarded attorney fees under R.C. 733.61.
- On appeal, the Sixth District reversed in part and affirmed in part: it held R.C. 3709.281 ambiguous and reasonably read to permit the City–District enforcement agreement; the unit‑count classification survived rational‑basis review; but the ordinance’s definition of "Owner" was unconstitutionally overbroad and irrational; remanded to reconsider attorney fees.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether R.C. 3709.281 authorized the health district to enforce Toledo’s lead ordinance | Mack: R.C. 3709.281 only allows delegation of a legislative authority and the District, a creature of statute, cannot exercise municipal enforcement/administrative powers | City/District: R.C. 3709.281 is broad ("perform any function or render any service") and permits the District to exercise powers on the municipality's behalf, including enforcement | Court: R.C. 3709.281 is ambiguous; reasonably construed to allow agreements for a health district to perform municipal services/administration on behalf of the municipality; trial court erred blocking enforcement on this basis |
| Whether the ordinance’s classification by number of rental units (single‑family and 1–4 units) violates equal protection | Mack: singling out small rental units while exempting larger multi‑unit properties lacks a rational relation to preventing lead poisoning | City: line‑drawing is rational; data show most child lead poisonings occur in single‑family/≤4‑unit rentals and incremental regulation is permissible | Court: classification is rationally related to the public‑health objective and survives rational‑basis review; trial court erred in striking it down |
| Whether the ordinance’s definition of "Owner" violates equal protection (overbroad/unworkable) | Mack: definition is so broad (includes tenants with utility accounts, agents, anyone who "maintains or operates" or performs minor acts) that it renders classifications irrational and imposes burdens on improper persons | City: disputes constitutional infirmity and proposes narrowing language (title‑holder definition) but offers no coherent rational basis for the broader text | Court: definition is unconstitutionally overbroad and irrational (would impose duties on tenants, minor contractors, utility account holders); trial court correctly invalidated that portion |
| Whether attorney fees under R.C. 733.61 were properly awarded to Mack | City: Mack sued prematurely without waiting for city law director response and acted for private economic interests; award thus improper | Mack: she made written request and litigation was necessary; her action conferred public benefit by preventing enforcement of flawed ordinance | Court: Mack had "good cause" to believe claims well‑founded so costs are allowable, but because relief was only partial the trial court must reconsider the amount (if any) of attorney fees awarded and remand for recalculation |
Key Cases Cited
- State ex rel. Ranz v. City of Youngstown, 140 Ohio St. 477 (Ohio 1942) (upheld contractual delegation framework and analyzed tax/levy limits when counties assume municipal functions)
- Ohio Apartment Ass'n v. Levin, 127 Ohio St.3d 76 (Ohio 2010) (rational‑basis review: distinctions by unit‑count in housing regulation/taxation can be upheld; line‑drawing need not be perfect)
- Roosevelt Props. Co. v. Kinney, 12 Ohio St.3d 7 (Ohio 1984) (supports deference to legislative line‑drawing under rational‑basis equal‑protection analysis)
- Bd. of Health of St. Bernard v. City of St. Bernard, 19 Ohio St.2d 49 (Ohio 1969) (local board of health is a state agency and a creature of statute)
- Simpkins v. Grace Brethren Church of Delaware, Ohio, 149 Ohio St.3d 307 (Ohio 2016) (sets out Ohio equal‑protection framework and the burden on challengers to negate conceivable bases)
- Campbell v. Cincinnati St. Ry. Co., 97 Ohio St. 283 (Ohio 1918) (distinguishes non‑delegable legislative power from delegable administrative implementation)
- Cline v. Ohio Bur. of Motor Vehicles, 61 Ohio St.3d 93 (Ohio 1991) (statutory interpretation principles: plain language controls; ambiguity invites construction)