MacFarlan v. IVY HILL SNF, LLC
2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 6362
| 3rd Cir. | 2012Background
- Macfarlan, a maintenance director, suffered a stroke on January 24, 2008 and went on FMLA leave January 29, 2008.
- A FMLA return date was anticipated for April 8, 2008, later adjusted; Macfarlan's doctor allowed return May 1 with 4-hour days and 20-pound lifting limits.
- Green Acres was sold to Ivy Hill on April 1, 2008; Ivy Hill terminated Macfarlan on April 20, 2008 and said he could reapply without lifting restrictions once cleared.
- Macfarlan received short-term disability benefits from Unum from February to August 2008 while still on leave.
- Macfarlan amended his complaint (Counts 1–4) alleging FMLA, Rehabilitation Act, ADA, and PHRA claims; district court granted Ivy Hill summary judgment on Counts 2–4 and on FMLA retaliation, then on Count 1 via judicial estoppel.
- Macfarlan appealed challenging the judicial estoppel ruling; the court elected to review both the estoppel ruling and the remaining claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the district court properly applied judicial estoppel to Macfarlan's FMLA claim | Macfarlan argues estoppel improperly foreclosed his restoration claim. | Ivy Hill contends inconsistent statements to Unum justify estoppel. | Judicial estoppel applied properly; inconsistent statements justified estoppel. |
| Whether the appeal properly encompassed Counts 2–4 despite the notice | Macfarlan seeks review of all counts in the amended complaint. | Ivy Hill argues only the FMLA reconsideration issue is within the notice. | Court may address non-designated issues under Murray doctrine; review of Counts 2–4 permitted. |
| Whether Ivy Hill regarded Macfarlan as disabled under Rehab Act, ADA, PHRA | Macfarlan contends Ivy Hill regarded him as disabled due to lifting restrictions. | Ivy Hill did not regard him as disabled; lifting restriction was non-chronic and temporary. | No disability regard under Acts; Ivy Hill not liable under Rehab Act, ADA, PHRA. |
| Standard and scope of review for summary judgment on the Acts claims | Macfarlan asserts genuine issues of material fact exist on disability status. | Record shows no qualifying disability and no regarded-as disability. | Summary judgment affirmed for Rehab Act, ADA, PHRA claims. |
Key Cases Cited
- Motley v. New Jersey State Police, 196 F.3d 160 (3d Cir.1999) (adopts Cleveland framework for judicial estoppel in statutory claims)
- Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (Supreme Court 1999) (framework for evaluating inconsistent statements under judicial estoppel)
- Detz v. Greiner Industries, Inc., 346 F.3d 109 (3d Cir.2003) (contextual explanations required for Cleveland framework)
- Murray v. Commercial Union Insurance Co., 782 F.2d 432 (3d Cir.1986) (review of arguments beyond the notice when appropriate)
- Callison v. Philadelphia, 430 F.3d 117 (3d Cir.2005) (employee must show entitlement to benefits and denial of them under FMLA)
- Rinehimer v. Cemcolift, Inc., 292 F.3d 375 (3d Cir.2002) (regarded-as disability standard; temp lifting restrictions not disability)
- Wilson v. MVM, Inc., 475 F.3d 166 (3d Cir.2007) (regarded-as analysis in disability claims)
- New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742 (Supreme Court 2001) (estoppel principles and integrity of judiciary)