430 P.3d 612
Utah2018Background
- Kirkpatrick MacDonald and Lee Anne MacDonald (Fahey) entered a mediated settlement incorporated into a 2010 divorce decree that awarded Fahey alimony through Dec. 2020 and gave her three unencumbered lots; MacDonald agreed to pay certain taxes/HOA fees until sale or five years.
- One lot sold shortly after the decree for $1,425,000 with both parties’ agreement; Fahey placed most proceeds into an investment account producing roughly $45,000/year.
- MacDonald petitioned to vacate or reduce alimony under Utah Code § 30-3-5(8)(i), arguing a substantial material change in circumstances warranted modification.
- The district court denied relief applying a Court of Appeals line of cases requiring changes not be "contemplated in the decree." The Court of Appeals instead applied the statutory language requiring a change be "not foreseeable" and affirmed on the ground the sale/investment was foreseeable.
- The Utah Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide (1) whether the preexisting "contemplated in the decree" standard is incorporated into the statute via the prior-construction canon, and (2) whether the specific sale/investment was unforeseeable.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (MacDonald) | Defendant's Argument (Fahey) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper legal standard for alimony modification under Utah Code § 30-3-5(8)(i)(i) | Prior-construction canon incorporates the Court of Appeals' "contemplated in the decree" test (actually anticipated at decree time) | Statute's plain language controls: change must be "not foreseeable" (reasonably anticipated) | Statute governs: requirement is that the change be "not foreseeable" at time of divorce; prior-construction canon inapplicable |
| Scope of information for foreseeability inquiry | Foreseeability should be judged only by what is in the divorce decree/record of the court that entered it | Foreseeability may include reasonable anticipations beyond decree language | Court adopts limitation: foreseeability is evaluated using the record of the court that entered the decree (or matters proper for judicial notice) |
| Whether Bolliger and related cases bind statute interpretation | Bolliger established "contemplated" standard and should carry forward into statutory interpretation | Bolliger did not authoritatively construe the 1995 statutory language and therefore does not control | Prior-construction canon requires an authoritative prior judicial construction of the same statutory language; none exists here, so Bolliger does not bind statutory meaning |
| Application to facts: Was Fahey's sale and investment unforeseeable? | Sale price/timing and investment returns were unforeseeable and thus constitute a substantial material change | Sale and investment were foreseeable based on decree terms and ordinary financial prudence; MacDonald failed to meet burden | Affirmed: sale and investment were foreseeable based on decree/record and judicially-noticed prudent financial behavior; MacDonald failed to prove unforeseeability |
Key Cases Cited
- Christensen v. Industrial Commission, 642 P.2d 755 (Utah 1982) (describes prior-construction canon and when judicial interpretations carry forward into amended statutes)
- Bolliger v. Bolliger, 997 P.2d 903 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) (applied "contemplated in the decree" standard but did not authoritatively construe the 1995 statute)
- Durfee v. Durfee, 796 P.2d 713 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (explains need for evidence in decree/record to show a change was anticipated)
- Johnson v. Johnson, 855 P.2d 250 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (requires trial courts to make findings on material issues of alimony and address foreseeable future income)
- Richardson v. Richardson, 201 P.3d 942 (Utah 2008) (limits prospective modifications within decrees to events certain to occur within a known timeframe)