2020 Ohio 4368
Ohio Ct. App.2020Background
- M.R., a Cincinnati police officer, sued Julie Niesen and Terhas White (and others) after social-media posts allegedly portrayed him as a white supremacist and threatened to publish his personal identifying information (PII).
- Claims included false light, defamation, violation of R.C. 2307.60, and negligence; M.R. also sought leave to proceed under a pseudonym (Sup.R. 45).
- At a July 24 hearing the trial court granted the Sup.R. 45 motion and, after hearing argument, denied M.R.’s request to order removal of the social-media posts but entered a limited temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining defendants from publishing M.R.’s PII pending a preliminary-injunction hearing.
- The court set a preliminary-injunction hearing; the TRO was continued when the hearing was postponed.
- Niesen and White appealed the trial court’s July 24 entry; M.R. moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing the TRO was not a final, appealable order.
- The court of appeals held the TRO was not a final, appealable order and dismissed the appeal, reasoning the TRO merely preserved the status quo regarding PII and was not equivalent to a preliminary injunction or a prior restraint requiring immediate review.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court's limited TRO is a final, appealable order | TRO is nonfinal — time-limited and preserves status quo until preliminary-injunction hearing | TRO is final and appealable because it restrains speech and imposes an immediate burden | Court: TRO is nonfinal; appeal dismissed |
| Whether the TRO constituted a prior restraint requiring immediate appellate review | No — TRO only barred publishing PII and was consistent with Sup.R.45 protection; prior-restraint doctrine applies to injunctions, not routine TROs | Yes — any court order restraining speech is a prior restraint and requires immediate review under First Amendment precedents | Court: Prior-restraint immediate-review rule applies to preliminary/permanent injunctions imposing prior restraints; not to this limited TRO |
| Whether the TRO was tantamount to a preliminary injunction because it followed a hearing and was extended | Not tantamount — parties objected to a preliminary-injunction hearing; court proceeded only on the TRO and plaintiff would have presented live testimony for an injunction | Tantamount — TRO followed a hearing with defendants present and was extended beyond the Civ.R. 65 initial period, so it functions like a preliminary injunction | Court: TRO was not tantamount to a preliminary injunction; its purpose was preservation of status quo on PII pending further hearing |
Key Cases Cited
- Natl. Socialist Party of Am. v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977) (orders imposing prior restraints on speech trigger strict procedural safeguards)
- Puruczky v. Corsi, 110 N.E.3d 73 (2018) (when a preliminary injunction constitutes a prior restraint on speech, immediate appellate review is required)
- Internatl. Diamond Exchange Jewelers, Inc. v. U.S. Diamond and Gold Jewelers, Inc., 70 Ohio App.3d 667 (1991) (a preliminary injunction that functions as a prior restraint on speech warrants immediate appellate review)