M. Mendez and MH&I, LLC v. City of Phila., Phila. Vacant Property Review Committee
M. Mendez and MH&I, LLC v. City of Phila., Phila. Vacant Property Review Committee - 1176 & 1600 C.D. 2016
| Pa. Commw. Ct. | Aug 1, 2017Background
- Philadelphia owned a vacant lot at 1707 N. Orianna St. (Orianna Property) between properties owned by Mendez/MH&I (1704 N. 3rd) and Gearhart (1708 N. 3rd).
- Gearhart applied in 2006 and 2012; Mendez applied on October 4, 2012. The Vacant Property Review Committee (VPRC) initially recommended sale to Mendez after an August 13, 2013 meeting.
- On August 29, 2013, HCD/VPRC employee Susie Jarmon sent Mendez a letter estimating the sale price and requesting confirmation and documentation; Mendez returned the paperwork on September 10, 2013.
- The VPRC later reconsidered, voted for a competitive sale, then on January 13, 2015 recommended selling to Gearhart (the earlier applicant). Neither City Council nor the Commissioner approved any final sale.
- Mendez sued to enjoin sale to Gearhart and to compel Philadelphia to sell to her, arguing the August 29, 2013 letter was a binding contract (or at least obligated Philadelphia to advance her application). The trial court held for the City; Commonwealth Court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial court erred by ruling before proposed findings were filed | May 4, 2016 ruling occurred before parties filed proposed findings, depriving Mendez of opportunity | Trial court later vacated the May 4 order, considered the filings, and reissued judgment | Moot: court vacated initial order and expressly considered the parties’ proposed findings when reentering judgment |
| Whether August 29, 2013 letter was a binding contract to sell the Orianna Property to Mendez | Letter confirmed sale terms and requested documents; Mendez says it created an enforceable sale contract | Letter was conditional, contained estimates, required further approvals and did not state a final price or unconditional acceptance | Not a contract: conditional language and lack of specific agreed price/acceptance meant only negotiations/confirmation of interest |
| Whether the letter at least required the City to forward Mendez’s application to the next administrative step | Letter obligated City to advance her application/process toward sale | Letter mentions approvals required but contains no promise to advance application | Rejected: letter did not obligate City to advance the application or guarantee next-step processing |
| Whether VPRC abused discretion such that sale to Gearhart should be enjoined | VPRC changed recommendation after City sent offer to Mendez and thus acted arbitrarily | Issue waived and VPRC is advisory; its recommendations are non-final and not judicially reviewable | Waived and non-reviewable: parties stipulated sole issue was the letter; VPRC is advisory and its recommendations are not final agency adjudications |
Key Cases Cited
- Parsons Bros. Slate Co. v. Dep’t of Highways, 211 A.2d 423 (Pa. 1965) (no contract without offer and unconditional acceptance)
- GMH Assocs., Inc. v. Prudential Realty Grp., 752 A.2d 889 (Pa. Super. 2000) (essential terms for real‑estate sale include parties, property, and purchase price)
- City of Scranton v. Heffler, Radetich & Saitta, LLP, 871 A.2d 875 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005) (statutory requirements for municipal contracts are mandatory)
- City of Phila. v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 937 A.2d 1176 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (mootness principles in appellate review)
- Innes v. Sch. Dist. of Nanticoke, 20 A.2d 225 (Pa. 1941) (parties must know the extent of the contracting officers’ power)
- Peluso v. Kistner, 970 A.2d 530 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (elements required to establish promissory estoppel)
