M.G. v. L.D., Appeal of: C.B.D.
155 A.3d 1083
| Pa. Super. Ct. | 2017Background
- Mother (L.D.) was convicted of attempted homicide and imprisoned after shooting M.G.; she seeks increased non-physical contact (weekly calls/letters/visits) with her biological daughter M.G.D., who is in M.G.’s custody.
- Grandfather (C.B.D.), Mother’s father, sought partial physical custody of M.G.D. alleging M.G.’s son E.G.D. physically abused M.G.D.; trial court initially granted temporary custody to Grandfather then later terminated his partial custody.
- Trial court’s custody proceedings produced conflicting expert testimony about sibling interactions: E.G.D.’s therapist (Dr. Norford) minimized risk; M.G.D.’s therapist (Dr. Schwarz) described repeated incidents and the child’s unhappiness.
- A court-appointed child advocate (Attorney Kane Brown, via MCAP) exercised broad delegated authority: reviewing/censoring Mother’s correspondence, terminating Grandfather’s visits, and offering testimony/opinions to the court. The court used the child advocate’s views in its rulings.
- The trial court denied Mother’s request for weekly telephone contact and denied Grandfather partial custody, reasoning concerns about antagonism and potential influence over the child rather than applying the statutory best-interest factors fully.
- On appeal, the Superior Court reversed and remanded: vacating the denial of Mother’s visitation/contact (remanding for consideration under prison-visitation factors) and directing reconsideration of Grandfather’s partial custody with proper §5328 analysis and clarification of the child advocate’s role.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether denying Mother (incarcerated parent) weekly phone/visitation infringed constitutional rights / was decided using correct factors | Mother: incarceration does not eliminate fundamental visitation rights; court must deny only to prevent severe adverse effect on child; trial court failed to apply prison-visitation factors | M.G.: restricting contact was justified by child’s welfare, antagonism, and potential negative influence on child-family dynamics | Court: Decision vacated; remand to apply visitation factors endorsed in D.R.C./Etter (age, travel, supervision, effect on child, genuineness of parent’s interest, past contacts, nature of criminal conduct) before denying visitation/contact |
| Whether Mother was denied meaningful communication by excessive child-advocate censorship | Mother: child advocate improperly micromanaged and censored correspondence, preventing meaningful communication | M.G.: child advocate acted within delegated protective authority to shield child from upsetting content | Court: Child-advocate overreach found problematic; remand directs court to clarify advocate’s statutory role and ensure limits on delegated authority |
| Whether Grandfather should have been denied partial custody because his motives were pretextual/alienating | Grandfather: his concerns for M.G.D.’s safety were legitimate; he did not discuss criminal matter with child and did not seek to alienate; denial lacked proper best-interest analysis | M.G.: Grandfather demeaned her, championed Mother’s innocence, and intended to elicit information from child — risking alienation and interference with parent-child relationship | Court: Trial court abused discretion by adopting speculative findings (relying on child advocate’s supposition) and failing to apply §5328(a)/(c)(1) best-interest analysis; remand to re-evaluate partial custody accordingly |
| Whether trial court improperly delegated judicial authority to the child advocate | Appellants: court improperly delegated substantive decisionmaking (censoring mail, terminating visits) to child advocate beyond statutory roles | Appellee: advocate’s actions were protective and within court’s delegation for child welfare in criminal-victim context | Court: Found unclear/overbroad delegation; ordered trial court to define advocate’s role and limit actions to statutorily authorized functions on remand |
Key Cases Cited
- D.R.C. v. J.A.Z., 31 A.3d 677 (Pa. 2011) (prison-visitation context: apply factors from Etter; nature of criminal conduct remains relevant)
- Etter v. Rose, 684 A.2d 1092 (Pa. Super. 1996) (enumerates factors for visitation with incarcerated parent)
- K.T. v. L.S., 118 A.3d 1136 (Pa. Super. 2015) (§5328(c)(1) grandparent custody requires full best-interest analysis)
- L.A.L. v. V.D., 72 A.3d 690 (Pa. Super. 2013) (grandparents of unmarried parents may have standing to seek partial custody under prior law)
- S.W.D. v. S.A.R., 96 A.3d 396 (Pa. Super. 2014) (standard of review for custody orders — defer to trial court’s credibility findings unless unreasonable)
- D.P. v. G.J.P., 146 A.3d 204 (Pa. 2016) (addressed constitutionality of portion of §5325(2) concerning standing for grandparents)
