929 F.3d 272
5th Cir.2019Background
- Plaintiffs are a certified class of children in Texas’s Permanent Management Conservatorship (PMC) alleging DFPS policies violated their substantive-due-process rights by (1) overburdened primary caseworkers and (2) inadequate monitoring/oversight of children in licensed foster care (LFC).
- In Stukenberg I, this Court affirmed liability on those two grounds, rejected other asserted liabilities (placement array and group homes per se), and vacated parts of a broad district-court injunction as not narrowly tailored; it issued a limited remand to modify the remedy consistent with that opinion.
- On remand the district court issued a modified injunction addressing multiple remedial provisions (including 24-hour supervision for certain placements, face-to-face visit rules, workload studies, an integrated computer-records requirement, remediation of missing medical records, monitor powers, and termination rules).
- Texas appealed, arguing many modified provisions exceeded the limited remand, were inconsistent with Stukenberg I, or were substantively improper (costly, burdensome, or not narrowly tailored).
- The Fifth Circuit (majority) reviewed compliance with the remand de novo and the injunction for abuse of discretion, and: affirmed some provisions, affirmed others with modification, and vacated others — notably vacating the integrated computer-system requirement and the face-to-face primary-caseworker mandate, while modifying the 24-hour supervision rule to apply only to licensed foster-care placements.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 24-hour awake-night supervision for placements >6 children | Needed to remedy inadequate supervision in group-like placements | Exceeds limited remand and is overbroad; also argued it should not apply to unlicensed kinship placements | Affirmed with modification: applies only to Licensed Foster Care (LFC) placements, not unlicensed placements |
| Monthly face-to-face visits must be conducted by primary caseworkers (precluding I-See-You workers from primary role) | Primary caseworkers are better trained and should conduct visits to protect children | Provision is a de facto ban on ISY use and exceeds remand by increasing primary workload | Vacated as inconsistent with Stukenberg I (would not directly remedy caseload violation and likely increases workload) |
| Workload studies for primary caseworkers and RCCL investigators under court/Monitor supervision | Court/Monitor oversight ensures studies are adequate given DFPS history | DFPS should be free to design and run studies itself per Stukenberg I | Affirmed: district court may supervise and Monitors may consult; DFPS still designs/conducts studies |
| Integrated computer-records system (centralized, migrated child records and access) | Centralized, accessible records are necessary to reduce workloads, inform placement and safety decisions, and remediate constitutional harms | System is unprecedented, extremely costly, and not required by Constitution; exceeds narrow remedy | Vacated: majority treats the requirement as beyond minimally required relief and “too blunt”; Judge Higginbotham dissented on this point |
| Remediation of missing/nonexistent medical and mental-health records tied to integrated system | Necessary to ensure access to health records and child safety | Justification depends on integrated system; burdensome if system vacated | Vacated along with integrated-system requirement (no longer justified) |
| Monitor provisions: remote access, compelled turnover of third-party study data, and payment of Monitors | Remote access and data help monitoring; Monitors should be compensated | Remote access raises confidentiality/security concerns; producing all third-party raw data is overly burdensome; payment is acceptable | Affirmed with modification: remote access allowed but Monitors’ staff/consultants must be qualified, trained, screened, and sign confidentiality agreements; compelled production of all prior third-party data vacated (except 2015–2016 workstudy data); payment upheld |
| Termination provisions of the injunction | Preserve continuity of remedial framework until compliance | State failed to raise these issues on earlier appeal | Challenged arguments waived; termination provisions not reconsidered on remand |
Key Cases Cited
- M.D. by Stukenberg v. Abbott, 907 F.3d 237 (5th Cir. 2018) (prior panel opinion establishing liability and limiting remedial scope)
- ODonnell v. Goodhart, 900 F.3d 220 (5th Cir. 2018) (limited-remand/mandate-rule discussion; explains limits on raising new issues on remand)
- Ball v. LeBlanc, 881 F.3d 346 (5th Cir. 2018) (mandate-rule and de novo review of compliance with remand)
- United States v. Lee, 358 F.3d 315 (5th Cir. 2004) (district court must implement both letter and spirit of appellate mandate)
- Daniels Health Scis., L.L.C. v. Vascular Health Scis., L.L.C., 710 F.3d 579 (5th Cir. 2013) (principle that injunctions must be narrowly tailored to the remedial need)