M. A. B. v. Buell, 466 P.3d 949

Background

Petitioner (M.A.B.) and respondent (Buell) were married; petitioner testified respondent raped her twice (Mar and May 2017) and, in June 2017, threatened to kill her and take their child if she left.
Petitioner left in July 2017, filed for dissolution, and sought a FAPA protective order on October 9, 2017; an ex parte restraining order issued and a contested hearing occurred October 20, 2017.
After separation, respondent sent erratic texts/emails, appeared unannounced once, and at a mediation stared at petitioner and yelled expletives, leaving petitioner shaken and escorted from the meeting.
The trial court found petitioner credible, characterized respondent’s communications and mediation conduct as intimidation, and continued the protective order, concluding petitioner faced an "imminent danger of further abuse."
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding the evidence insufficient to show imminent danger after separation; the Oregon Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, concluding (1) "imminent" retains a temporal (near-future) meaning, (2) courts must apply a totality-of-circumstances test (separation is relevant but not dispositive), and (3) the record supports the trial court’s finding of imminent danger; the case was remanded to the Court of Appeals to address the credible-threat issue.

Issues

Issue	M.A.B.'s Argument	Buell's Argument	Held
Meaning of "imminent danger of further abuse"	"Imminent" should not be read to impose a narrow near‑future temporal limit; legislature softened prior "immediate and present" standard.	"Imminent" plainly means near at hand; statutory text and ORS 107.718(5) support a temporal limit.	"Imminent" retains a temporal (near‑future) limit; courts use plain meaning; the statute includes recent threats as examples.
Relevance of petitioner moving out (ORS 107.710(3))	Moving out cannot be used to deny relief; courts must not treat separation as dispositive.	Separation reduces risk; absence of post‑separation abuse undercuts imminence.	Separation is a relevant fact to consider under the totality of circumstances but is not per se dispositive.
Whether a continuing post‑separation pattern is required	Court of Appeals imposed a de facto requirement that abuse continue after separation; that is improper.	Lack of continued post‑separation abusive conduct shows no imminent risk.	No categorical rule requiring a post‑separation pattern; a pattern can be probative but not always necessary—courts assess totality of circumstances.
Sufficiency of the record to support "imminent danger" finding	Past rapes, murder threat, persistent erratic/angry post‑separation conduct (texts, mediation stare) reasonably support an inference of near‑future risk.	No repeated threats, no physical attempts since separation, and parties live apart—evidence insufficient.	Record supports the trial court’s implicit findings; reasonable factfinder could infer respondent was reasonably likely to abuse in the near future. Court reversed COA and remanded to decide the credible‑threat issue.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 206 P3d 1042 (Or. 2009) (statutory interpretation starts with text and context)
State v. Turnidge, 359 Or 364, 374 P3d 853 (Or. 2016) (give plain meaning to undefined, non‑technical statutory terms)
Botofan‑Miller v. Miller, 365 Or 504, 446 P3d 1280 (Or. 2019) (standards for appellate review of trial‑court factual findings)
Ball v. Gladden, 250 Or 485, 443 P2d 621 (Or. 1968) (presume facts decided consistent with trial court’s ultimate conclusion when findings are not explicit)
State v. Jackson, 364 Or 1, 430 P3d 1067 (Or. 2018) (presumptions about implied findings when express findings are absent)