M.A.B. v. Bd. of Educ. of Talbot Cnty., 286 F. Supp. 3d 704

Plaintiff M.A.B., a transgender male student, was barred by school policy from using the boys' locker room and required to use single‑user restrooms or locker rooms; he alleges disciplinary consequences and harms to his social transition and medical care.
M.A.B. sued the county Board and school officials under Title IX, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and Maryland Declaration of Rights Articles 24 and 46; he sought a preliminary injunction and defendants moved to dismiss.
Defendants argued the Board is immune under the Eleventh Amendment and that Title IX and constitutional claims fail as a matter of law (Title IX should be limited to birth sex; Equal Protection only merits rational basis review).
The court found Maryland’s waiver statute § 5‑518(c) removes Eleventh Amendment immunity for these claims and declined to dismiss on immunity grounds.
On the merits at the motion‑to‑dismiss stage, the court held (1) allegations that M.A.B. was denied access to the boys’ locker room because he is transgender state a Title IX gender‑stereotyping claim, and (2) the policy is subject to heightened scrutiny under Equal Protection and fails that scrutiny as pleaded.
The court denied the requested preliminary injunction without prejudice because M.A.B. was not enrolled in PE for the then‑current year, so the alleged harm was not shown to be imminent.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Eleventh Amendment immunity	Md. statute waives immunity for county boards for claims ≤ $100,000 and tort/constitutional claims; Board not immune	Board asserts sovereign immunity bars suit	Waiver applies to these claims; Board not immune, dismissal denied
Title IX: does it cover discrimination against transgender students?	Title IX prohibits sex discrimination including gender‑stereotyping; transgender status is actionable as sex discrimination	Title IX should be read to apply only to birth sex distinctions per 34 C.F.R. §106.33	Transgender discrimination can be alleged under a gender‑stereotyping theory; M.A.B.’s allegations survive dismissal
Equal Protection: level of scrutiny for transgender classifications	Policy is sex‑based and transgender status is at least quasi‑suspect; apply intermediate scrutiny	Transgender status is not a suspect class; apply rational basis review	Policy treated as sex‑based and transgender quasi‑suspect; intermediate scrutiny applies; policy fails as pleaded
Preliminary injunction: irreparable harm	Immediate irreparable harm from locker‑room exclusion; injunction needed before school year	No imminent harm because plaintiff not enrolled in PE this year	Denied without prejudice — plaintiff failed to show actual and imminent harm before merits decision

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (gender stereotyping is actionable sex discrimination)
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (Title VII protections extend beyond principal concerns to comparable evils)
G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir.) (interpreting Title IX issues re transgender students)
Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034 (7th Cir.) (denial of restroom/locker access to transgender student violates Title IX and Equal Protection on a gender‑stereotyping theory)
Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir.) (employment discrimination against transgender person is sex discrimination)
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (sex‑based classifications require an exceedingly persuasive justification under intermediate scrutiny)
EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir.) (Title VII protects transgender employees under sex discrimination theories)