Lyons v. Teamhealth Midwest Cleveland
2011 Ohio 5501
Ohio Ct. App.2011Background
- On November 14, 2008, eight-year-old Tyler J. Miller died after breathing problems and a fever led to cardiac arrest; Lyons is his mother and plaintiff.
- Lyons and decedent lived in Lisbon, Ohio; Lyons called for emergency medical assistance around 5:16 a.m. and dispatcher Jones received the call on a non-emergency line.
- Jones had two months on the job; his training included reviewing a policy manual and input from Sickelsmith, who assisted him in the first weeks.
- Jones obtained the address as 6181 Allen Drive, Lisbon-Canfield Road, and chose to contact KLG for ambulance dispatch, believing the address was closer to Perry Township.
- KLG dispatched the Salem squad rather than the Lisbon squad based on Jones’s guidance; Sickelsmith later discovered the Allen Drive address was in Lisbon and updated KLG, but dispatch confusion persisted and the Lisbon squad could not be rerouted.
- Lyons contends the county’s dispatch system, though contracting with private ambulance services, involved governmental functions; the trial court denied summary judgment on immunity, which is the subject of this appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is Columbiana County immune under 2744.02(A)? | Lyons argues dispatch of emergency calls is governmental, not proprietary. | County contends dispatch is governmentally immune or falls under 2744.02(B) exceptions only if proprietary. | County immune under 2744.02(A) for governmental function; second-tier exceptions not satisfied. |
| Do 2744.02(B) proprietary-function exceptions apply to the dispatch activity? | Dispatching to a private ambulance service is proprietary, removing immunity. | Dispatch remains a governmental function; private ambulance provision does not convert to proprietary. | Proprietary-function exception does not apply; immunity remains for dispatch as a governmental function. |
| Are Sickelsmith and the county immune under 2744.03(A)(6)(b) for reckless/wanton conduct? | Sickelsmith and Jones may have acted recklessly; need trial to determine. | Immunity applies unless actions were malicious, bad faith, or wanton/reckless; evidence shows not for Sickelsmith. | Sickelsmith entitled to immunity; Jones denied immunity on this record; question of recklessness for Jones remanded. |
| Did Jones act with recklessness or failure to perform duties warranting non-immunity under 2744.03(A)(6)(b)? | Jones’s guess about location and resulting dispatch may constitute recklessness. | Jones was trained not to guess; any recklessness is for a jury to decide given the contested facts. | There is a genuine issue of material fact as to Jones’s recklessness; not resolved on summary judgment. |
Key Cases Cited
- Hubbell v. Xenia, 115 Ohio St.3d 77 (Ohio 2007) (final, appealable order in immunity question under 2744.02(C))
- Cramer v. Auglaize Acres, 113 Ohio St.3d 266 (Ohio 2007) (three-tier immunity analysis for political subdivisions)
- Colbert v. Cleveland, 99 Ohio St.3d 215 (Ohio 2003) (three-tier framework and exceptions to immunity)
- McCloud v. Nimmer, 72 Ohio App.3d 533 (Ohio App. 1991) (private performance of governmental functions does not negate immunity)
- O’Toole v. Denihan, 118 Ohio St.3d 374 (Ohio 2008) (recklessness standard for 2744.03(A)(6)(b))
- Gladon v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth., 75 Ohio St.3d 312 (Ohio 1996) (definition of wanton conduct)
- Brockman v. Bell, 78 Ohio App.3d 508 (Ohio App. 1992) (willful misconduct distinct from wanton conduct)