Lynne Donovan v. FirstCredit, Inc., 983 F.3d 246

In April 2019 FirstCredit mailed Donovan a medical-debt demand in an envelope with two glassine windows; through the top window were visible unchecked boxes with the phrases “Payment in full is enclosed” and sometimes “I need to discuss this further. My phone number is _.”
Donovan alleged the visible language and checkboxes on the envelope risked public disclosure of her debtor status, causing embarrassment and emotional distress, and sued under the FDCPA § 1692f(8) and Ohio’s CSPA.
FirstCredit moved for judgment on the pleadings arguing § 1692f(8) should be read to include a judicially implied “benign language” exception; the district court adopted that view (relying on Strand and Goswami) and granted judgment for FirstCredit.
On appeal the Sixth Circuit first held Donovan pleaded Article III standing because § 1692f(8) protects a concrete privacy interest and a statutory violation alone can suffice to allege injury in fact.
On the merits the Sixth Circuit reversed: it held § 1692f(8) is unambiguous and does not contain a “benign language” exception; markings not necessary for mail delivery (and not the debt collector’s address or permissible business name) can violate § 1692f(8).
The court remanded for further proceedings and directed that its FDCPA analysis applies equally to the CSPA claim.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Standing	Donovan: statutory violation risks public disclosure of debtor status and thus is a concrete injury protecting privacy	FirstCredit: mere risk/technical violation is not a concrete injury in fact	Donovan has standing; FDCPA §1692f(8) protects a concrete privacy interest and a statutory violation can suffice to allege injury
Interpretation of §1692f(8) (benign-language exception)	Donovan: plain text prohibits any language/symbols on envelope other than collector address/name; no benign-language exception	FirstCredit: literal reading absurdly forbids delivery-essential markings; legislative history/FTC guidance supports a benign-language exception	§1692f(8) is unambiguous; no benign-language exception; carve-outs only for delivery-essential markings, the collector’s address, and a business name that does not indicate debt-collection
Application to facts	Donovan: checkboxes/phrases visible through window are not delivery-essential and identify the mail as debt collection	FirstCredit: markings are benign and do not indicate debt-collection	Allegations that visible checkboxes and phrases were on envelope state a plausible §1692f(8) claim; judgment on pleadings reversed
State-law CSPA claim	Donovan: FDCPA violation establishes CSPA violation	FirstCredit: challenged via dismissal below	Remanded; FDCPA analysis controls remand treatment of CSPA claim

Preston v. Midland Credit Mgmt., 948 F.3d 772 (7th Cir. 2020) (interprets §1692f(8) as barring markings except those required for mail delivery)
Strand v. Diversified Collection Serv., 380 F.3d 316 (8th Cir. 2004) (reads a benign-language exception into §1692f(8))
Goswami v. American Collections Enters., 377 F.3d 488 (5th Cir. 2004) (adopts a benign-language exception tied to unfair or unconscionable markings)
Douglass v. Convergent Outsourcing, 765 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 2014) (treats visibility of certain markings as implicating FDCPA privacy concern)
Macy v. GC Servs. LP, 897 F.3d 747 (6th Cir. 2018) (explains when procedural statutory violations can constitute concrete injury)
Cagayat v. United Collection Bureau, 952 F.3d 749 (6th Cir. 2020) (held markings visible through glassine windows fall within §1692f(8))
St. Pierre v. Retrieval-Masters Creditors Bureau, 898 F.3d 351 (3d Cir. 2018) (recognizes invasion of privacy as a concrete harm under FDCPA)
DiNaples v. MRS BPO, 934 F.3d 275 (3d Cir. 2019) (stood for standing where envelope markings posed a risk of disclosure)
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (Supreme Court on concreteness requirement for Article III standing)