Lyniece Nelson v. City of Madison Heights, 845 F.3d 695

Background

On Oct. 19–20, 2011, Oakland County Officer Chad Wolowiec investigated suspected drug activity at a Motel 6; nineteen-year-old Shelly Hilliard (a confidential informant) agreed to place a call to arrange a drug purchase so officers could intercept the dealer.
Hilliard signed a confidential informant form but was not told she would have to testify or that her identity would be publicly disclosed; Wolowiec removed her from the room for safety while officers conducted a traffic stop to intercept the dealer.
During the stop, Wolowiec (for reasons he could not explain) told the dealer’s companion that Hilliard had set them up; that companion later told the dealer, who then (with an accomplice) abducted, murdered, burned, and dismembered Hilliard.
Hilliard’s mother, Nelson, sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a state-created-danger claim (substantive due process), wrongful death, and interference with familial relations against Wolowiec and others; the district court denied Wolowiec’s summary judgment motion invoking qualified immunity.
The Sixth Circuit, reviewing de novo, affirmed denial of summary judgment as to the state-created-danger claim, concluding a reasonable jury could find Wolowiec affirmatively increased Hilliard’s risk and acted with deliberate indifference, depriving her of a clearly established due‑process right to personal security.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Wolowiec is entitled to qualified immunity on a § 1983 state‑created‑danger claim	Nelson: Wolowiec’s disclosure was an affirmative act that increased Hilliard’s risk and violated due process	Wolowiec: Actions did not create/increase risk; Hilliard voluntarily acted as informant; split‑second disclosure precludes deliberate indifference	Denied: Jury could find affirmative act increased risk and violated clearly established right; qualified immunity not appropriate at summary judgment
Effect of Hilliard’s voluntary status as confidential informant	Nelson: Hilliard did not consent to identity disclosure or to testimony; her status doesn’t bar liability	Wolowiec: Summar precludes liability where informant voluntarily assumed risks	Rejected Summar as controlling: facts differ—no notice here that identity/testimony would be required and officer directly exposed her to the threat
Whether disclosure amounted to deliberate indifference / subjective recklessness	Nelson: Wolowiec knew risk (removed her from room; little known about dealer) and nonetheless disclosed identity	Wolowiec: He warned Hilliard and called afterward; disclosure was unplanned and not deliberately indifferent	Denied: Fact issue for jury; record permits reasonable jury to find subjective recklessness
Appellate reviewability of familial‑relations claim denial	Nelson: asserted interference with familial relations under § 1983	Wolowiec: argued claim fails as matter of law	Court: declined to address because Wolowiec did not raise qualified‑immunity argument on that claim; no jurisdiction over collateral issue on appeal

Key Cases Cited

Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055 (6th Cir.) (state may not, by affirmative acts, create or greatly increase risk of private violence; anonymity essential to safety of undercover agents)
Jones v. Reynolds, 438 F.3d 685 (6th Cir.) (elements of state‑created‑danger claim: affirmative act, special danger, and knowledge)
Summar v. Bennett, 157 F.3d 1054 (6th Cir.) (informant who was told he might have to testify and thus risked exposure—court found no state‑created‑danger liability under those facts)
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (qualified immunity standard for discretionary officials)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (summary‑judgment standard; credibility determinations are for the jury)