284 So.3d 1206
La. Ct. App.2019Background
- Plaintiff Lynda Gauthier, a mobile-home occupant provided temporary housing by Foster Homes after her house fire, fell from the exterior landing while opening an outward-swinging door and suffered a life‑threatening subdural hematoma.
- Mobile home set up Jan 2016: landing measured ~38" x 39"; ramp installed to the left of the front door; handrail on the right side of the stairs; door opened outward from right to left leaving limited landing depth when opened.
- Plaintiff's expert (engineer Philip Beard) measured the landing, produced diagrams, and opined the door/landing/ramp/handrail configuration created an unreasonable risk, though he acknowledged the landing met the IRC 36" requirement and was unsure whether ADA applied.
- Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing (1) code compliance shows no unreasonable defect, (2) the condition was open and obvious, and (3) plaintiff had admitted using the stairs when the fall occurred.
- Trial court granted summary judgment; the appellate court affirmed, holding IRC compliance and the open-and-obvious nature of the condition precluded a finding of an unreasonably dangerous defect under La. C.C. art. 2317.1.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the landing/entryway was a "defect" (unreasonably dangerous) under La. C.C. art. 2317.1 | Beard: door swing, shallow landing, ramp/handrail layout created unreasonable risk | Landing complied with IRC; condition was ordinary and not unreasonably dangerous | Held: No unreasonable defect; landing complied with IRC and did not present an unreasonable risk |
| Whether compliance with IRC (36" landing) negates unreasonable-risk claim | Plaintiff: reasonableness is a fact question despite code compliance | Defendant: IRC compliance shows safety and forecloses unreasonable-risk finding | Held: IRC compliance supports no genuine issue of material fact; court relied on compliance |
| Whether the condition was open and obvious (defeating duty) | Plaintiff: condition was subtle, not obvious; expert said it might not be obvious | Defendant: configuration was apparent to anyone using the entry; plaintiff had been using it for weeks | Held: Condition was open and obvious; no duty to protect against obvious hazards |
| Appropriateness of summary judgment given expert testimony and factual disputes | Plaintiff: summary judgment improper where reasonableness is disputed and expert raised issues | Defendant: no reasonable juror could find for plaintiff; movant met burden to show absence of factual support | Held: Summary judgment appropriate; no genuine issue of material fact existed |
Key Cases Cited
- Todd v. Angel, 132 So. 3d 453 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2014) (defines "defect" under art. 2317.1 and considers open‑and‑obvious factor)
- Bufkin v. Felipe’s Louisiana, LLC, 171 So. 3d 851 (La. 2014) (defendant generally owes no duty to protect against obvious hazards)
- Broussard v. State ex rel. Office of State Buildings, 113 So. 3d 175 (La. 2013) (discusses obviousness as limiting duty)
- Hutchinson v. Knights of Columbus, Council No. 5747, 866 So. 2d 228 (La. 2004) (open‑and‑obvious hazard doctrine explained)
- Wynn v. Luck, 106 So. 3d 111 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2012) (reasonableness and surrounding circumstances govern defective‑thing analysis)