LYNCH v. WALSH
2:13-cv-01493
| W.D. Pa. | Jun 20, 2016Background
- Lynch was convicted in Allegheny County of first‑degree murder, a firearms offense, and possessing an instrument of crime; sentenced to life plus 19–84 months (2003). Trial counsel was Warner Mariani.
- Lynch appealed; Superior Court affirmed (2006); Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied review. Lynch later filed a PCRA petition with evidentiary hearings; PCRA relief was denied and the Superior Court affirmed (2012–2013).
- Lynch filed a federal habeas petition raising seven claims: four ineffective‑assistance claims for failure to locate/call witnesses (Viola Jones, Myron Cox, Monea/Mona Davenport, Derrick Lawrence), Brady violations for nondisclosure of pretrial witness statements, and two mistrial/trial‑court error claims (one based on prosecutor closing statements).
- The magistrate applied AEDPA deference and Strickland for IAC claims, reviewing credibility findings from the PCRA record and whether nondisclosures caused prejudice warranting mistrial.
- Outcome: Magistrate recommends denial of the §2254 petition and denial of a certificate of appealability, concluding state courts reasonably applied federal law and factual findings are entitled to deference.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. IAC for failing to call alibi (Viola Jones) | Jones would have provided alibi that Lynch was at Jones residence all day | Trial counsel investigated but could not locate Jones; her testimony would be cumulative to other alibi witnesses | Denied — PCRA credibility finding favoring counsel and lack of prejudice reasonable under Strickland/AEDPA |
| 2. IAC for failing to call eyewitness (Myron Cox) | Cox was present and could have testified favorably | Counsel’s investigator could not locate Cox and counsel did not know Cox was present in court | Denied — counsel credibly unable to locate Cox; no deficient performance shown |
| 3. IAC for failing to locate/interview Monea/Mona Davenport | Davenport’s police interview suggested exculpatory information that counsel should have discovered | Police reports do not show counsel could have located her; no affidavit/testimony from Davenport; speculative impact | Denied — speculative benefit and no proof counsel unreasonably failed to investigate or prejudice resulted |
| 4. IAC for failing to discover Derrick Lawrence | More probing of Cox would have revealed Lawrence, whose account points to another shooter | Lawrence was not in police discovery; counsel had no reason to know of him; Lawrence admitted he was hiding and unlikely to testify | Denied — counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to call unknown witness; no prejudice shown |
| 5. Brady violation for nondisclosure of pretrial interviews (Tracy Johnson, Darcell Boyd) | Prosecution failed to disclose interview content that impeached or should have been provided, depriving defense | Majority of undisclosed matters emerged at trial; defense impeached witnesses; no bad faith shown and no substantial prejudice | Denied — nondisclosure did not undermine trial outcome; no Brady prejudice established |
| 6. Trial court error for not granting mistrial sua sponte (prosecutor closing) | Prosecutor’s references to undisclosed taped statements infected trial fairness | Prosecutor’s remarks were fair comments responding to defense impeachment and did not create manifest necessity for mistrial | Denied — comments did not render trial fundamentally unfair under Greer |
| 7. Trial court error in denying requested mistrial based on nondisclosure | Defense moved for mistrial when undisclosed interview matters surfaced | Court afforded sidebar and time; jury heard the testimony and defense cross‑examined/impeached; omission not prejudicial | Denied — no abuse of discretion; no showing that results would differ |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑prong standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecution must disclose exculpatory/impeachment evidence)
- Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756 (1987) (mistrial sua sponte requires manifest necessity; comments must so infect trial as to deny due process)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (AEDPA deference: relief only if state decision is contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law)
- Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011) (limits federal habeas review under AEDPA to the state‑court record for certain determinations)