Lynch v. Lynch
540 S.W.3d 107
Tex. App.2017Background
- Married 1988; separated March 2015; no children together. Donna (wife) filed for divorce Feb 2016, alleging cruelty, adultery, family violence and seeking disproportionate property division and appellate fees.
- Michael (husband) was served by a licensed process server but did not answer or appear; trial proceeded April 22, 2016 in his absence and the court entered a default divorce decree largely adopting Donna’s proposed inventory and awards.
- Decree: divorce granted for adultery/cruelty; Donna awarded a disproportionate share of community estate; money judgments for unpaid temporary support and debts; Michael ordered to pay federal income tax liabilities through 2015; each party responsible for 2016 taxes; decree included a broad mutual indemnity clause and awarded Donna $10,000 for appellate attorney’s fees (conditioned on unsuccessful appeal).
- Michael moved to set aside the default judgment and for new trial, claiming he reasonably believed service was informal (based on past out-of-state experience), and asserted meritorious defenses to property division; at the evidentiary hearing the process server testified she identified herself and told Michael of the hearing date.
- Trial court denied Michael’s motions; on appeal Michael raised 16 issues challenging denial of new trial, property division, tax allocations, indemnity clause, and appellate-fee award.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Donna) | Defendant's Argument (Michael) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Motion to set aside default judgment / new trial | Default valid; process was proper and trial court's credibility findings should stand | Service was informal; mistake of law excused failure to answer and a meritorious defense exists | Denial affirmed — trial court could find Michael acted with conscious indifference; Craddock test first element not met by Michael |
| 2. Disproportionate property division | Property division supported by Murff factors (fault, family violence, dissipation, income disparity) | Award (effectively ~100% to Donna) is grossly disproportionate and unjust | Affirmed — trial court did not abuse discretion; evidence supported disproportionate award |
| 3. Federal income tax allocation (pre-2016 and 2016) | Court may allocate marital tax liabilities; Donna requested pre-2016 allocation to Michael and separate-tax treatment for 2016 | Pre-2016 allocation improper or unsupported; 2016 partition mischaracterizes community property without agreement | Pre-2016 allocation upheld (within court’s discretion and Michael failed to show harm). 2016 mischaracterization noted but harmless (no reversible harm shown) |
| 4. Indemnity clause and appellate attorney’s fees | Sought enforcement-related indemnities and appellate fees | Indemnity provision was never pleaded or proved; appellate-fee award had no evidentiary support | Indemnity clause (broad mutual provision) reversed/deleted for lack of pleading; appellate-fee award reversed and remanded for new hearing on fees (no evidence of reasonableness) |
Key Cases Cited
- Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 133 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. 1939) (standard for vacating default judgments)
- Sutherland v. Spencer, 376 S.W.3d 752 (Tex. 2012) (Craddock burden when moving to set aside default)
- Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. 1981) (factors for just-and-right division of community estate)
- Walker v. Gutierrez, 111 S.W.3d 56 (Tex. 2003) (limits on mistakes of law as Craddock excuses)
- Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. 1998) (burden to prove reasonableness of attorney’s fees)