Lynch v. City of New York
952 F.3d 67
| 2d Cir. | 2020Background
- On June 22, 2015 Lynch participated in a Black Lives Matter–affiliated march in Harlem; he had recent spinal surgery and was at the rear, moving slowly.
- Officer Mariann Mandy (allegedly without warning) and another officer grabbed Lynch while he stood on the south sidewalk at W. 104th, threw him into a van, handcuffed him tightly, and took him to a precinct where he was held ~5 hours without access to a bathroom or food; Lynch later required spinal procedures for injuries he attributes to the arrest.
- Mandy signed three summonses accusing Lynch of (1) obstructing traffic (N.Y. Penal § 240.20(5)), (2) walking in the middle of the street after refusing an order to move (N.Y. Penal § 240.20(6)), and (3) violating VTL § 1156(a); criminal charges were dismissed in January 2016 after multiple court appearances.
- Lynch sued the City and individual NYPD defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, excessive force, and Monell municipal liability based on an alleged NYPD “False Observation” practice (Legal Bureau instructing officers to fabricate observations).
- The district court dismissed all claims, finding probable cause for arrest and that the municipal allegations were conclusory; Lynch appealed.
- The Second Circuit affirmed dismissal as to Delarosa, Lombardo, and Paverman, but vacated and remanded as to Mandy and the City, holding the district court improperly failed to accept well-pleaded factual allegations and that the Complaint plausibly alleged a Monell practice linking Legal Bureau conduct to false observations.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether district court properly found probable cause for Lynch's arrest (false arrest claim) | Lynch: Complaint alleges he was on sidewalk except for crossing and that Mandy never ordered him to move or refused him — so no probable cause | City/Officers: Summons narrative shows Lynch was in roadway, blocking traffic, and refused lawful order; that alone established probable cause | Reversed as to Mandy: court must accept well-pleaded factual allegations and draw inferences for plaintiff; those allegations preclude a legal finding of probable cause at pleading stage |
| Whether municipal (Monell) claims plausibly alleged a City practice of instructing officers to fabricate observations | Lynch: Pleading cites Officer Cai's testimony (MacNamara) and multiple later lawsuits showing Legal Bureau involvement, allowing inference of an ongoing False Observation practice that continued into 2015 | City: Allegations are boilerplate, rely on other suits and inadmissible or non-integral materials; no causal municipal policy shown | Reversed as to City: Complaint, taken as a whole, plausibly alleges a continuing practice tying Legal Bureau conduct to false arrest narratives; Monell claims survive pleading stage |
| Whether Delarosa’s memo-book entry may be treated as part of the complaint to support a claim against Paverman (collusion) | Lynch: Delarosa’s memo (produced in limited discovery) notes a consultation with Legal Bureau attorney Paverman referencing "PO Mandy," supporting inference of Paverman’s role | Defendants: Memo is not a written instrument that defines rights/liabilities and is not integral to the complaint; allegation of collusion is speculative | Affirmed: Claims against Paverman dismissed — the complaint’s allegation that Paverman "possibly" colluded is conclusory and memo is not integral such that it must be treated as part of the pleading |
| Sufficiency of claims against Delarosa and Lombardo and supervisory liability (including denial of bathroom/food) | Lynch: Alleged supervisory hostility and that Lombardo instructed denial of bathroom/food; alleged Delarosa involvement in arrests generally | Defendants: Complaint contains no factual link between those defendants and Lynch’s arrest, and deprivation allegations are de minimis without adverse consequences | Affirmed: Claims against Delarosa and Lombardo dismissed for failure to plead factual involvement or constitutional-level deprivation |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standard: accept well-pleaded facts as true; legal conclusions not assumed; plausibility requirement)
- Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (pretrial detention conditions: not every inconvenience is punitive; de minimis threshold)
- Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability under § 1983 for customs or policies causing constitutional violations)
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (pleading must state a plausible claim; calls for sufficient facts to allow discovery)
- International Audiotext Network, Inc. v. AT&T, 62 F.3d 69 (2d Cir. 1995) (when courts may consider documents not attached to complaint: incorporation by reference and “integral” materials)
- Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (on a Rule 12 motion courts must accept well-pleaded factual allegations and construe inferences for plaintiff)
- Anderson News, LLC v. Am. Media, Inc., 680 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 2012) (on pleadings court should not choose between competing plausible inferences)
- Patel v. Contemporary Classics, 259 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2001) (Rule 12(c) standard identical to Rule 12(b)(6))