Lynch v. Christie
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101032
| D. Me. | 2011Background
- Lynch sues Christie for defamation and wrongful use of civil proceedings arising from Christie’s earlier federal lawsuit against Lynch and related web-based statements.
- Christie filed a special motion to dismiss under Maine's anti-SLAPP statute, asserting her petitioning activities protected by the right to petition.
- Earlier events include Christie’s June 2009 chiropractic visit, alleged June 15 incident, police and licensing investigations, and dismissal of Christie’s federal suit with prejudice in September 2010.
- After dismissal, Christie and others published online posts stating accusations of sexual abuse by a South Portland chiropractor, later identifying Lynch by name.
- Lynch incurred substantial counseling and legal fees defending the prior and current claims.
- The court denies Christie’s anti-SLAPP and Rule 12(b)(6) motions, allowing Lynch’s claims to proceed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope of Anti-SLAPP coverage | Lynch contends web posts are petitioning activity. | Web posts fall outside petitioning scope since not before a judicial body. | Web-based statements assumed within scope for analysis. |
| Standard of review for anti-SLAPP | Court should assess factual support and injury with a summary-judgment-like standard. | Law Court standard not identical to federal summary judgment; evidence matters. | Court treats as akin to summary judgment but with Maine standard; evidence shows lack of factual support and actual injury. |
| Actual injury and factual support | Lynch must show actual injury and lack of factual support for petitioning. | Christie’s statements could have factual support and did not cause injury beyond ordinary distress. | Lynch produced strong evidence of devoid-of-factual-support and actual injury; anti-SLAPP denied. |
| Defamation and wrongful use of civil proceedings claims | Web statements identify Lynch and are not privileged; wrongful-use element shown by improper purpose. | Absolute privilege for statements related to legal proceedings; improper purpose lacks proof. | Defamation claim survives; wrongful-use claim denied on pleadings but allowed to proceed on merits. |
Key Cases Cited
- Lindell, 942 A.2d 1226 (Me. 2008) (requires evidence of actual injury and non-trivial damages)
- Maietta Const., Inc. v. Wainwright, 847 A.2d 1169 (Me. 2004) (defines compensable injury and excludes mere emotional distress)
- Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 620 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (prima facie case requirement for anti-SLAPP-like analysis)
- Morse Bros., Inc. v. Webster, 772 A.2d 842 (Me. 2001) (summary judgment analog in anti-SLAPP context; burden on movant)
- Protect Our Mountain Environment, Inc. v. District Court, 677 P.2d 1361 (Colo. 1984) (anti-SLAPP standard: devoid of reasonable factual support or lack of basis in law)
- Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Prods. Corp., 427 Mass. 156, 691 N.E.2d 935 (Mass. 1998) (outline of new anti-SLAPP style burden shifting)
- Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2010) (anti-SLAPP framework applicable to federal proceedings in First Circuit)