Lyme Land Conservation Trust, Inc. v. Platner, 159 A.3d 666

Background

Defendant Beverly Platner purchased a 18.7-acre property in Lyme containing ~14.3 acres subject to a recorded 1981 Declaration of Restrictive Covenants (a conservation restriction) held and enforceable by plaintiff Lyme Land Conservation Trust, Inc.
Declaration's Article I (Restrictions) prohibited activities such as placing soil/sand, excavating, clearing/destroying vegetation, and building structures in the protected area; Article II (Reservations) carved out specified rights (e.g., mowing, planting, cultivation) "notwithstanding" Article I.
After purchase Platner extensively altered the protected meadow and woodlands: frequent mowing, installation of irrigation, addition of topsoil, reseeding with lawn grasses, heavy fertilization/pesticides, ornamental plantings and tree rings, understory mowing in woodlands, relocation of driveway (encroaching protected area), and spreading sand to create an artificial beach.
Plaintiff sued alleging violations of the Declaration and General Statutes § 52-560a (encroachment/penalties). Trial court found willful violations, ordered restoration (specific remediation measures), awarded $350,000 in statutory/punitive damages under § 52-560a(d), and $300,000 in attorney’s fees.
Supreme Court affirmed interpretation that Platner violated the Declaration and upheld the equitable restoration order and most factual findings, but reversed parts of the fee and damages awards and remanded for recalculation consistent with statutory limits.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
1) Whether Platner’s activities violated the Declaration / § 52-560a(b)	Activities (mowing, soil/sand placement, irrigation, reseeding, understory mowing, driveway) exceeded reservations and violated Article I prohibitions; declaration unambiguous	Reservations (esp. §2.2 "mowing of grass") permit mowing, planting, cultivation and thus authorized much of defendant’s conduct	Court: Declaration was unambiguous; reservations do not encompass activities that destroyed native vegetation, added soil/sand, installed irrigation, or created structures; affirmed violation.
2) Authority to order restoration/remediation plan	Court may grant injunctive and equitable relief under Declaration §3.5, §47-42c, and §52-560a(c); remediation plan within broad equitable powers	Defendant argued statutes/declaration only allow return to prior precise condition, not court-designed remediation excluding some prior species	Court: Equity permits tailored restoration; court had authority to order remediation approximating prior natural condition; affirmed.
3) Whether factual record supported restoration specifics (2007 baseline, sand deposit)	Plaintiff presented expert botanist testimony, photos, invoices and reports supporting 2007 condition and sand delivery/placement	Defendant argued insufficient evidence of 2007 condition and placement of sand	Court: Deference to trial fact-finder; expert and circumstantial evidence sufficed; findings not clearly erroneous; affirmed.
4) Properness and scope of attorney’s fees and §52-560a(d) damages	Fees and statutory damages appropriate given prevailing on enforcement claims; court’s damages anchored in expert $90–100k estimate	Defendant challenged inclusion of fees for separate inland wetlands proceedings and appealed commission, and that damages award exceeded statutory multiplier and lacked current cost basis	Court: Fees for withdrawn declaratory portion of same action were allowable, but fees tied to separate administrative commission proceedings/appeal were not recoverable; initial damages award was supported by expert estimate, but after court adopted a different plan with no cost evidence, punitive damages could exceed 5x restoration cost—award vacated and remanded for recalculation.

Key Cases Cited

Wykeham Rise, LLC v. Federer, 305 Conn. 448 (conveyance/declaration construction reviewed plenarily)
Morgenbesser v. Aquarion Water Co. of Connecticut, 276 Conn. 825 (unambiguous restrictive covenants enforced as written)
Gino’s Pizza of East Hartford, Inc. v. Kaplan, 193 Conn. 135 (contractual terms given ordinary meaning when unambiguous)
Wall Systems, Inc. v. Pompa, 324 Conn. 718 (broad equitable powers to fashion remedies)
Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn. 338 (statutory interpretation standard; plenary review)
CCT Communications, Inc. v. Zone Telecom, Inc., 324 Conn. 654 (standard for clearly erroneous factual findings)
Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Proctor, 324 Conn. 245 (deference to trial court factual findings)
In re Nevaeh W., 317 Conn. 723 (trial court discretion to credit expert testimony)
Rawls v. Progressive Northern Ins. Co., 310 Conn. 768 (circumstantial evidence has full probative force)
Elm City Cheese Co. v. Federico, 251 Conn. 59 (damages award review; abuse of discretion standard)
ACMAT Corp. v. Greater New York Mutual Ins. Co., 282 Conn. 576 (review of attorney’s fees awards for abuse of discretion)
Trumbull Electric Mfg. Co. v. John Cooke Co., 130 Conn. 12 (interpretation of "said" as "before-mentioned")