Lyde v. State
311 Ga. App. 512
Ga. Ct. App.2011Background
- Lyde was convicted in Glynn County of four molestation counts involving two victims, with a total sentence of 30 years.
- Two counts involved the first victim (who was under 18 at trial), and the fourth count involved the second victim (who was 8–10 at the time).
- The State sought to admit similar-transaction evidence from five additional victims; three testified they were molested by Lyde in childhood.
- During trial, the court and counsel discussed whether Lyde's presence was required for a motion related to good-character evidence; the court allowed a strike of non-responsive testimony about good character, and Lyde was present for the ruling.
- Lyde challenged (a) denial of his right to be present at a critical stage or ineffective assistance for waiving it, and (b) the indictment's tolling of statutes of limitation for victims under 16.
- The trial court denied Lyde’s motion for new trial on these grounds; on appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the denial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Right to be present at a critical stage | Lyde argues counsel waived his presence, violating his right. | Lyde contends the waiver violated due process and his right to be present. | No reversible error; absence during the motions discussion was not a critical stage. |
| Indictment tolling for failure to plead tolling | Indictment fails to plead tolling under OCGA 17-3-2.1 for victims under 16. | Indictment sufficiently put Lyde on notice of tolling; Tompkins/Grizzard support tolling by alleging under-16 victims. | Indictment sufficiently invoked tolling; no error in tolling theory. |
Key Cases Cited
- Huff v. State, 274 Ga. 110 (Ga. 2001) (defines 'critical stage' for right to be present under Georgia Constitution)
- Peterson v. State, 284 Ga. 275 (Ga. 2008) (ineffective-assistance framework for right-to-be-present claims)
- Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (U.S. 1934) (presence only required if reasonably substantial to defense)
- Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730 (U.S. 1987) (right to be present depends on fairness of the proceeding)
- Pennie v. State, 271 Ga. 419 (Ga. 1999) (defines critical-stage scope and waiver considerations)
- Parks v. State, 275 Ga. 320 (Ga. 2002) (absence in bench conferences may not violate right to be present)
- Ferrell v. State, 261 Ga. 115 (Ga. 1991) (pretrial scheduling conferences not critical stages)
- Barrett v. State, 275 Ga. 669 (Ga. 2002) (no violation when judge confers with counsel before jury instruction)
- Tompkins v. State, 265 Ga. App. 760 (Ga. App. 2004) (tolling and age-based exceptions discussed; later part of case reversed on other grounds)
- Grizzard v. State, 258 Ga. App. 124 (Ga. App. 2002) (tolling under OCGA 17-3-2.1 involves under-16 victims)
- Moss v. State, 220 Ga. App. 150 (Ga. App. 1996) (statutory tolling considerations and indictment sufficiency)
