Luther Stanley v. Cottrell Inc., 784 F.3d 454

Background

Plaintiff Luther Stanley, a car hauler, fell from the upper deck of a flattop trailer and suffered severe leg injuries with substantial medical bills. He sued manufacturer Cottrell for negligence, strict product liability, breach of warranty, and outrage, alleging the trailer lacked ladders/handholds/extended catwalks.
Trial featured conflicting expert testimony about whether federal width limits (108 inches) allowed additional safety devices; Stanley's expert (Micklow) testified the trailer was 102" and could accommodate protections; Cottrell's expert (Widas) testified the trailer was 108" and could not.
Stanley sought to call two lay rebuttal witnesses (himself and a co-worker) to contradict Widas on trailer width; the district court excluded that rebuttal as cumulative because Micklow had already testified to the same point.
Parties agreed on verdict directors and converse instructions in principle, but the court read slight variations: the converse instructions used the phrase "product defect"; Stanley did not make a specific contemporaneous objection to the wording.
The jury found for Cottrell (no fault, no damages). Stanley moved for a new trial and objected to the bill of costs; the district court denied the new trial motion and taxed costs of $11,171.92 to Stanley. Stanley appealed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Exclusion of proposed rebuttal lay testimony about trailer width	Excluding Stanley and Miller prevented rebuttal of Widas; testimony was necessary and not cumulative	Rebuttal would have merely repeated plaintiff's expert (Micklow); testimony was cumulative and properly excluded	Affirmed — exclusion was within district court's discretion because testimony was cumulative and not uniquely necessary
Jury instruction (Instruction 18) language / converse accuracy	Instruction 18 used "product defect" instead of "negligence," risking conflation of strict liability with negligence (ordinary care element)	Instructions as a whole and order distinguished the two claims; converse used substantially similar language so no prejudice	Affirmed — error not preserved; instruction fairly presented law and did not mislead jury
Award of expert deposition fees under §1920(6)	Challenge that §1920(6) authorizes only court-appointed expert fees, so Micklow fees are unauthorized	Expert deposition fees recoverable under Rule 26(b)(4) as reasonable fees for discovery; Rule 26 can supersede §1821 limits	Affirmed — fee award permissible under Rule 26 for discovery-related expert fees
Taxation of both printed and electronic transcript costs under §1920(2)	Argued §1920(2) allows fees for "printed or electronically recorded transcripts" (disjunctive), not both	Statute read conjunctively in context; both forms may be taxed if necessarily obtained for case	Affirmed — §1920(2) permits both printed and electronic transcripts when each was necessarily obtained

Key Cases Cited

Life Plus Int'l v. Brown, 317 F.3d 799 (8th Cir.) (standard for reviewing admissibility of rebuttal testimony)
Olson v. Ford Motor Co., 481 F.3d 619 (8th Cir.) (exclusion of cumulative rebuttal evidence not an abuse of discretion)
Mawby v. United States, 999 F.2d 1252 (8th Cir.) (rebuttal of surprise testimony only in unique circumstances)
Bauer v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 680 F.3d 1043 (8th Cir.) (preservation rule for jury instruction objections)
Friedman & Friedman, Ltd. v. McCandless, 606 F.3d 494 (8th Cir.) (instruction review focuses on whether instructions as a whole present law fairly)
Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, 482 U.S. 437 (U.S. Supreme Court) (discussing witness fees and related principles)
Craftsmen Limousine, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 579 F.3d 894 (8th Cir.) (permitting recovery of both printed and electronic transcripts when necessarily obtained)
In re Ricoh Co. Patent Litig., 661 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir.) (supporting taxation of both transcript forms when necessary)