Luther Scott, Jr. v. Tom Schedler, 826 F.3d 207

Plaintiffs (NAACP and individuals) sued Louisiana officials alleging violations of the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) by state agencies and that Secretary of State Tom Schedler failed to coordinate and enforce NVRA compliance.
After a bench trial the district court found violations and entered a permanent injunction directing Schedler to “maintain in force” his “policies, procedures, and directives…relative to the implementation of the NVRA” and to implement any outstanding measures by a set date.
Schedler certified compliance with the original injunction, listing specific actions his office took (rules, forms, manuals, trainings, coordinator).
A Fifth Circuit panel earlier affirmed that Schedler has an ongoing duty to coordinate and enforce the NVRA for in-person transactions and remanded for modification of the injunction in certain respects.
On remand the district court entered an Amended Permanent Injunction that again ordered Schedler to maintain in force his (unspecified) policies, procedures, and directives. Schedler appealed the amended injunction.
The Fifth Circuit panel here vacated the Amended Permanent Injunction for failing Rule 65(d)’s specificity requirements and remanded for the district court to detail the acts restrained/required and to limit the injunction to Schedler’s enforcement responsibilities as to in-person transactions.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the Amended Permanent Injunction states its terms specifically under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(1)(B) and describes the acts restrained/required in reasonable detail under 65(d)(1)(C)	The injunction adequately requires Schedler to maintain his NVRA-related policies/procedures/directives; Schedler previously certified compliance, showing he knows the measures.	The injunction is vague and references unidentified “policies, procedures, and directives, as revised,” leaving Schedler unable to know what conduct is required or prohibited.	Vacated: injunction is insufficiently specific under Rule 65(d); remanded for the district court to specify the acts and define the referenced policies/procedures/directives.
Whether the injunction is tailored to remedy only the violations proved (i.e., not overbroad)	Injunction appropriately addresses the enforcement/coordination duties found to be violated.	Injunction may be overbroad if it extends beyond the in-person enforcement duties the court previously recognized.	Court declined to decide overbreadth on this appeal but directed the district court on remand to limit scope to Schedler’s enforcement of the NVRA as to in-person transactions.

Thomas v. County of Los Angeles, 978 F.2d 504 (9th Cir. 1992) (injunction referencing a defendant’s own unspecified policies fails Rule 65(d) specificity)
U.S. Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 519 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1975) (an injunction must give an ordinary person notice of proscribed conduct; vagueness is a due-process concern)
Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U.S. 473 (1974) (Rule 65(d) specificity requirements are substantive, not technical)
Daniels Health Scis., L.L.C. v. Vascular Health Scis., L.L.C., 710 F.3d 579 (5th Cir. 2013) (injunctions must state terms specifically and describe restrained/required conduct)
Veneman (Doe v. Veneman), 380 F.3d 807 (5th Cir. 2004) (distinguishing vagueness vs. breadth; injunctions must be narrowly tailored to remedy the specific action)
Gulf King Shrimp Co. v. Wirtz, 407 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1969) (injunction may reference statutory standards without impermissibly importing undefined external content)