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716 F.3d 781
3rd Cir.
2013
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Background

  • Espinoza, a native of Ecuador, became a lawful permanent resident in 1980 and faced deportability based on a 1993 cocaine sale conviction.
  • Espinoza initially sought a §212(c) discretionary relief; proceedings were closed after he was paroled to INS custody and his relief was never adjudicated.
  • In 2007 Espinoza was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine (an aggravated felony) and sentenced to 120 months.
  • DHS reopened the 1994 deportation case in 2010, adding the 2007 conviction as a new deportability ground; hearings proceeded without counsel.
  • An IJ ordered Espinoza removed in 2011; the BIA affirmed in 2011 and 2012, holding Espinoza ineligible for §212(c) relief under the five-year bar.
  • Espinoza appeals, arguing eligibility for §212(c) relief and due process; court agrees he is barred and affirms the BIA’s removal order.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
Whether the five-year bar strips §212(c) relief for aggravated felons. Espinoza seeks §212(c) relief under equity. Espinoza had served ≥5 years for an aggravated felony, barred by statute. Yes; five-year bar applies and precludes relief.
Whether transitional IIRIRA rules allow relief notwithstanding the five-year bar. Equitable application should permit relief under pre-IIRIRA rules. Statutory bar applies irrespective of IIRIRA transitional rules. Inapplicable; bar applies regardless of IIRIRA transition.
Whether the due process claims regarding counsel and procedural timing have merit. IJs failed to provide proper counsel list and process violated due process. Record shows compliance with counsel-list requirements; no prejudice. No due process violation; proceedings adequate.
Whether Caroleo's equitable considerations override the five-year bar. Equity allows nunc pro tunc relief despite later five-year bar. Statutory text forecloses relief for aggravated felons with ≥5 years. Distinguishable; Caroleo does not apply; statute controls.

Key Cases Cited

  • INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (1990s) (established discretionary relief under §212(c) as a matter of statutory analysis)
  • Avila-Macias v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 108 (3d Cir. 2003) (explains removal proceedings terminology post-IIRIRA)
  • Fadiga v. Att’y Gen., 488 F.3d 142 (3d Cir. 2007) (de novo review; standard for due process claims and legal questions)
  • Caroleo v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 158 (3d Cir. 2007) (equitable relief discussion; distinguishable from Espinoza fact pattern)
  • Scheidemann v. INS, 83 F.3d 1517 (3d Cir. 1996) (interprets 1990 §212(c) bar language as applied to aggravated felonies)
  • Pereira v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2005) (commentary on five-year bar interpretation of §212(c))
  • Perez v. Elwood, 294 F.3d 552 (3d Cir. 2002) (discusses scope of §212(c) and AEDPA regime)
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Case Details

Case Name: Lupera-Espinoza v. Attorney General of the United States
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Date Published: May 28, 2013
Citations: 716 F.3d 781; 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 10645; 2013 WL 2302330; 12-2007
Docket Number: 12-2007
Court Abbreviation: 3rd Cir.
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    Lupera-Espinoza v. Attorney General of the United States, 716 F.3d 781