Lundeen v. Turner (Slip Opinion), 2021 Ohio 1533

Background

Wells Fargo filed a foreclosure against Cynthia Lundeen in 2016; certified-mail service of the third amended complaint failed and the clerk recorded ordinary-mail service on Jan. 18, 2017 under Civ.R. 4.6(D).
Lundeen moved to dismiss under Civ.R. 12 but did not assert insufficiency of service or lack of personal jurisdiction in those motions and failed to file a timely answer.
A magistrate granted summary judgment to Wells Fargo on Feb. 14, 2018; the trial court adopted that decision and entered a final foreclosure judgment on Apr. 13, 2018. Lundeen’s belated filings were struck.
Lundeen appealed and also pursued a 2018 prohibition action; the court of appeals dismissed that prohibition action sua sponte, finding the appeal an adequate remedy.
In Nov. 2019 Lundeen filed a new prohibition action (claiming untimely service within one year, lack of Wells Fargo’s standing, and magistrate error) and sought an emergency stay of a scheduled sheriff’s sale; the court of appeals issued an alternative writ but then dismissed the action sua sponte, ruling the appeal provided an adequate remedy (and erroneously calling the action moot).
The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, holding prohibition inappropriate because Lundeen had adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law (raise service/personal-jurisdiction defenses in the trial court and on appeal or seek postjudgment relief).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
1) Whether defective service/personal-jurisdiction defects justify prohibition	Lundeen: ordinary-mail service did not reach her; presumption of service is rebutted so trial court lacked personal jurisdiction	Appellees: service presumption stands and Lundeen waived service defense by litigating without asserting it; she had adequate remedies in trial court and on appeal	Held: Prohibition inappropriate; failure of service is a personal-jurisdiction issue for the trial court (and appeal) and Lundeen waived the defense by prior litigation conduct
2) Whether failure to obtain service within one year (Civ.R. 3(A)/R.C. 2305.17) means the action was never commenced and supports prohibition	Lundeen: failure to serve within one year means action never commenced, so trial court lacked jurisdiction	Appellees: "failure to commence" is not a separate jurisdictional defense from insufficiency of service or statute-of-limitations concerns	Held: No separate "failure to commence" jurisdictional defense; the rule affects commencement for limitations but does not create a prohibition basis
3) Whether Wells Fargo’s alleged lack of standing voids the foreclosure judgment and warrants prohibition	Lundeen: Wells Fargo lacked evidentiary standing to bring the foreclosure, so judgment is void	Appellees: Standing to sue on the note is not a subject-matter jurisdiction defect; standing disputes are reviewable on the merits and on appeal	Held: Lack of standing here does not affect subject-matter jurisdiction; appeal is the adequate remedy
4) Whether magistrate procedural error or mootness/res judicata supports extraordinary relief	Lundeen: procedural errors and prior rulings do not preclude prohibition; her later affidavit rebuts service presumption	Appellees: Procedural errors are not jurisdictional; prior proceedings/appeal provide adequate remedies and many issues were adjudicated	Held: Court of appeals erred in finding mootness but correctly dismissed because adequate remedies existed (trial court remedies and appeal); procedural claims do not justify prohibition

Key Cases Cited

State ex rel. Neguse v. McIntosh, 161 Ohio St.3d 125, 161 N.E.3d 571 (2020) (courts may take notice of related dockets when evaluating writ complaints)
Gliozzo v. Univ. Urologists of Cleveland, Inc., 114 Ohio St.3d 141, 870 N.E.2d 714 (2007) (insufficiency-of-service defense not waived if properly raised; filing certain motions or responsive pleading omissions can constitute waiver)
State ex rel. Suburban Constr. Co. v. Skok, 85 Ohio St.3d 645, 710 N.E.2d 710 (1999) (prohibition does not lie for defective service unless complete failure to meet constitutional minimum-contacts)
Downs v. Panioto, 107 Ohio St.3d 347, 839 N.E.2d 911 (2006) (limitations on use of prohibition for personal-jurisdiction challenges)
Moore v. Mt. Carmel Health Sys., 162 Ohio St.3d 106, 164 N.E.3d 376 (2020) (Civ.R. 3(A) and R.C. 2305.17 explain when an action is ‘‘commenced’’ for limitations purposes)
Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 141 Ohio St.3d 75, 21 N.E.3d 1040 (2014) (a plaintiff’s lack of standing to foreclose does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction of the common pleas court)
Maryhew v. Yova, 11 Ohio St.3d 154, 464 N.E.2d 538 (1984) (defendants who timely asserted lack of personal jurisdiction preserved that defense)
Lincoln Tavern, Inc. v. Snader, 165 Ohio St. 61, 133 N.E.2d 606 (1956) (trial court has authority to vacate void judgments for lack of service)
Connor v. McGough, 46 Ohio St.3d 188, 546 N.E.2d 407 (1989) (narrow recognition that prohibition may lie for lack of personal jurisdiction in certain circumstances)