Lund v. Milford Hospital, Inc.
SC19834
| Conn. | Sep 26, 2017Background
- Justin Lund, a Connecticut state trooper, was injured while subduing Dale Pariseau, an emotionally disturbed person who had been transported to Milford Hospital for emergency psychiatric evaluation after attacking officers at an I-95 crash.
- Lund went to the hospital to check on the injured officers; he alleges hospital staff showed Pariseau restrained but later allowed him to go to the bathroom unaccompanied and unrestrained.
- Pariseau exited the bathroom throwing a container of hot liquid and urine; Lund slipped, pursued, and was injured during the effort to subdue Pariseau.
- Lund sued Milford Hospital for negligence (failure to supervise/restrain, inadequate security, improper training, etc.).
- The trial court granted Milford’s motion to strike the original complaint based on the policies underlying the firefighter’s rule, and then sustained the defendant’s objection to Lund’s substitute complaint, entering judgment for the defendant.
- Lund appealed; the Connecticut Supreme Court examined (1) whether the substitute complaint was materially different from the stricken complaint and (2) whether the firefighter’s rule barred Lund’s negligence claim.
Issues
| Issue | Lund’s Argument | Milford’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the substitute complaint is materially different from the stricken complaint | Substitute complaint added facts distancing Lund from Pariseau’s committal and addressed defects; therefore appeal preserved | Substitute pleading restates the original and is not materially different, so waiver applies | Substitute complaint was materially different and appeal preserved |
| Whether the firefighter’s rule bars Lund’s negligence claim | Firefighter’s rule is limited to premises-liability claims; ordinary negligence claim against a custodian is not barred | Policies underlying firefighter’s rule should bar claims by officers injured while acting on duty, even in non‑premises contexts | Firefighter’s rule does not extend to ordinary negligence non‑premises claims; plaintiff stated a valid cause of action |
| Whether Kaminski or related precedents preclude Lund’s claim | Kaminski is distinguishable (vicarious parental liability/warning duty); Levandoski and later Sepega limit rule to premises liability | Kaminski and some trial decisions apply firefighter’s rule broady to similar facts to bar recovery | Kaminski distinguished; Sepega controls—rule limited to premises liability, so Kaminski does not preclude recovery here |
| Remedy on appeal | Reverse judgment and remand for further proceedings on Lund’s negligence claims | Affirm trial judgment (argued below) | Judgment reversed; case remanded for further proceedings |
Key Cases Cited
- Kaminski v. Fairfield, 216 Conn. 29 (1990) (discusses limits on liability and vicarious duty to warn in context of officer injured by third party)
- Levandoski v. Cone, 267 Conn. 651 (2004) (explains firefighter’s rule concerns and premise that rule addresses premises‑liability contexts)
- Parsons v. United Technologies Corp., 243 Conn. 66 (1997) (articulates standard for when an amended pleading is "materially different" to avoid waiver)
- Sepega v. DeLaura, 326 Conn. (2017) (clarifies firefighter’s rule does not extend beyond premises liability and distinguishes Kaminski)