Lund v. Lund, 2014 ND 133

March 2011 appellate reaffirmed property division from Lund v. Lund, including 1991 deed to Wendell/Orville of 40 acres; May 2011 Wendell filed implied-contract suit against parents; claim sought >$545,000 and transfer of land; Betty Lund moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction (Arizona resident); district court dismissed, then remanded; after trial court dismissed all claims for lack of implied-contract and unjust enrichment, this appeal followed.
On remand, Betty Lund amended to add cross-claim against Orville; Orville did not answer; Betty moved for default on cross-claim; trial court later held no implied contract and dismissed all claims; court found no unjust enrichment due to reciprocal family benefits; court relied on presumption services by family are gratuitous.
Court recognized two forms of implied contracts (implied in fact and implied in law) and applied standard of clearly erroneous review; findings reflected credibility determinations; no exceptional or extraordinary services shown by Wendell to overcome gratuity presumption.
Court noted benefits to Betty Lund were not inequitable to require payment; evidence showed Wendell’s contributions were not extraordinary compared to siblings.
This Court treated memorandum order as final disposition of all claims and affirmed final judgment dismissing action in its entirety.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether there was an implied-in-fact contract between Wendell and his parents	Lund alleged 1985 agreement and ongoing conduct.	No mutual intent or extraordinary services shown; presumption of gratuitous family services.	No implied-in-fact contract; lack of extraordinary services; no reversal.
Whether Wendell could recover under implied-in-law or unjust enrichment theories	Benefits conferred by Wendell to parents should be compensated.	Benefits were not inequitable to require payment; reciprocity and family context negate unjust enrichment.	No recovery under unjust enrichment; affirmed denial.
Whether the appeal is from a final judgment or proper memorandum order	There was a final disposition of all claims.	Memorandum order might be non-final, invalidating appeal.	Memorandum order intended as final disposition; treated as final judgment and affirmed.

Jerry Harmon Motors, Inc. v. Heth, 316 N.W.2d 324 (N.D. 1982) (implied contracts; mutual intent and interpretation of conduct)
In re Estate of Lutz, 620 N.W.2d 589 (N.D. 2000) (gratuitous presumption for family services; exceptional services rebut)
Lord & Stevens, Inc. v. 3D Printing, Inc., 756 N.W.2d 789 (N.D. 2008) (implied-in-fact contract standard; conduct-based formation)
St. John Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 3 v. Engineers-Architects, P.C., 414 N.W.2d 285 (N.D. 1987) (implied contracts; implied-in-fact vs. implied-in-law distinction)
Erickson v. Brown, 813 N.W.2d 531 (N.D. 2012) (unjust enrichment factors; five elements; absence of contract)
Midwest Fed. Savs. Bank v. Symington, 393 N.W.2d 753 (N.D. 1986) (memorandum orders possible appeal from final disposition)
Lund v. Lund, 795 N.W.2d 318 (N.D. 2011) ( prior property-distribution determination; 40-acre transfer deemed improper)