Luna Torres v. Lynch, 136 S. Ct. 1619

Jorge Luna Torres, a lawful permanent resident, pleaded guilty (1999) to attempted third‑degree arson under New York law and received minimal punishment; immigration authorities later initiated removal proceedings.
The INA defines “aggravated felony” by listing many offenses, several as crimes “described in” specific federal statutes, and states that listed offenses qualify “whether in violation of Federal or State law.”
Federal arson statute 18 U.S.C. §844(i) criminalizes malicious damage by fire or explosive to property “used in interstate or foreign commerce” (i.e., it contains an interstate‑commerce jurisdictional element); New York’s arson statute lacks any commerce element but otherwise mirrors the federal substantive elements.
The Immigration Judge and the BIA held Luna’s New York conviction was an aggravated felony because the state offense is equivalent to the federal statute except for the federal commerce/jurisdictional element; the Second Circuit denied review and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The central legal question: whether a state offense that matches all substantive elements of a listed federal crime but lacks a federal jurisdictional (interstate commerce) element is nonetheless an aggravated felony under §1101(a)(43).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Luna)	Defendant's Argument (Government)	Held
Whether a state crime that matches a listed federal statute except for the interstate‑commerce element is an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(43) (i.e., when an offense is “described in” the federal statute).	“Described in” requires express replication of each federal element; because NY arson lacks the commerce element, it is not “described in” §844(i) and thus not an aggravated felony.	“Described in” needs only core substantive correspondence; jurisdictional commerce elements are technical hooks for federal power and should be ignored when comparing federal and state offenses.	A state offense that has every element of a listed federal crime except a jurisdictional interstate‑commerce element qualifies as an aggravated felony; the commerce element is disregarded.

Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821) (limits on Congress’s power to punish crimes generally; federal crimes need a constitutional hook)
United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63 (1984) (jurisdictional language need not contain the same mens rea as other elements)
Lewis v. United States, 523 U.S. 155 (1998) (when comparing federal and state offenses under the Assimilative Crimes Act, courts may ignore jurisdictional elements)
Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc., 547 U.S. 9 (2006) (distinguishing substantive elements from jurisdictional phrases like "affect commerce")
Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000) (interpretation of “used in interstate commerce” as requiring active commercial use)
United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671 (1975) (defendant need not know the fact that confers federal jurisdiction)
United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321 (1906) (syllabus disclaimer cited regarding reporter preparation)