Lulu Schwartz and Robert Schwartz v. Jody Lynn Johnson and Jody Lynn Johnson P. C., 05-21-00959-CV

Lulu and Robert Schwartz sued Jody Lynn Johnson and her firm (former amicus attorney in the Schwartzes’ family‑law matter) in August 2020 asserting 13 causes of action (fraud, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, DTPA, unjust enrichment, etc.).
Appellees moved for traditional summary judgment (June 2021) on three independent grounds: qualified immunity under Tex. Fam. Code §107.009(a), res judicata/collateral estoppel, and lack of duty/standing.
The trial court denied the Schwartzes’ continuance request, ruled on evidentiary objections, and granted summary judgment on July 27, 2021, without specifying which ground(s) supported the ruling.
The Schwartzes filed a motion for new trial and first asserted the judge should recuse (because the judge’s husband previously represented one of the Schwartzes) at the new‑trial hearing; a verified written motion to recuse was filed 23 days after that hearing and 86 days after the summary judgment.
The trial court did not rule on the recusal motion or refer it; the motion for new trial was overruled by operation of law.
On appeal the court affirmed: because appellants challenged only the immunity ground, the unchallenged grounds required affirmance; the court also found no abuse of discretion regarding the unruled new‑trial and recusal matters given timeliness and Rule 18a principles.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
1. Grant of summary judgment	Summary judgment was improper because genuine fact and legal issues existed.	Summary judgment proper because (1) qualified immunity under Fam. Code §107.009(a), (2) res judicata/collateral estoppel, and (3) no duty/standing.	Affirmed. Appellants challenged only immunity; failing to negate the other two grounds required affirmance.
2. Trial judge’s recusal	Judge should have recused due to husband’s prior representation of a Schwartz in the underlying divorce.	Recusal motion was untimely; grounds were known years earlier and not asserted before/within Rule 18a deadlines.	No abuse of discretion. Motion untimely; movant failed to show recusal required.
3. Failure to rule on motion for new trial	Court abused discretion by not ruling on the new‑trial motion.	Motions for new trial may be overruled by operation of law; courts need not issue express rulings.	No abuse of discretion. New‑trial motion was overruled by operation of law.
4. Failure to follow Rule 18a procedures	Court violated Rule 18a by not following recusal referral/processing requirements.	Rule 18a timing controls; because motion was untimely and filed after hearing, the special referral/limitation rules did not require different action.	No abuse of discretion. Under facts here, Rule 18a procedures did not mandate vacatur or referral.

Ortiz v. State Farm Lloyds, 589 S.W.3d 127 (Tex. 2019) (standard for reviewing summary judgment de novo and taking nonmovant’s evidence as true)
Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656 (Tex. 2005) (summary judgment review principles)
Lujan v. Navistar, Inc., 555 S.W.3d 79 (Tex. 2018) (movant’s burden and nonmovant’s response to traditional summary judgment)
Jarvis v. Rocanville Corp., 298 S.W.3d 305 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009) (when trial court’s order does not state grounds, appellant must negate all possible grounds on appeal)
Transp. Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. 1994) (motions for new trial may be overruled by operation of law)
Drake v. Walker, 529 S.W.3d 516 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2017) (abuse‑of‑discretion standard for recusal rulings)
Hansen v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 346 S.W.3d 769 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011) (objective test for judicial impartiality: whether a reasonable member of the public would doubt impartiality)
Bourgeois v. Collier, 959 S.W.2d 241 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1997) (Rule 18a timeliness and mandatory referral requirements when motion timely filed)
Carmody v. State Farm Lloyds, 184 S.W.3d 419 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006) (untimely recusal motion after hearing is not abuse of discretion)